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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to u-_. Ann., Sec 78 2a 3(2} (:I ). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Standard of Review A t ria. 1 rourt' s awar^ of custody 
wil ] n o t be u p s e t " a b s e n t a show i IKJ ol am ijbi l se of 
manifest injustice," Mauahan v. Mauahan, 7 70 P..2d 156 (Utah App. 
1989) . Here there has been such an abuse <-• discretion because 
the Court's findings are not rat-innallv based • :e. 
See Martinez v Martinez, 72 8 P..:: -:M *-;ah 19 86) (findings must 
be rati ona] 3 y supported by evidence • Jie record) . 
1. Child custody, ... ""ourt abuse ifs discretion 
in awarding custody of the parties' childrer? to plaintiff: 
a. By failing to consider une best interests of 
the children? 
b. By erroneously finding that: plaintiff wis t:he 
children's primary caretaker? 
c. By relying on the sixteen-month-old report: of 
Elizabeth Stewart and speculating as to what each 
parent would have to offer the children i n their teen 
years? 
d By ignoring the past conduct and demonstrated 
mora ] standards of each of the parties? 
e By failing to consider which parent was more 
likely to provide the other with frequent, continuing 
contact with the children? 
f. By committing a series of reversible 
evidentiary errors and by refusing to consider evidence 
of witness tampering involving the use of firearms and 
death threats against defendant? 
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
1. Section 30-3-3 0, Utah Code Ann i 
(1) In determining custody, the court shall con-
sider the best interests of the child and the past 
1 
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each 
of the parties. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consid-
er, among other factors the court finds relevant, 
which parent is most likely to act in the best 
interests of the child, including allowing the 
child frequent and continuing contact with the 
noncustodial parent.. .. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case and Disposition Below. 
Appellant disputes the trial court's award of custody of the 
parties' three minor children to plaintiff. 
2. Factual Background. Appellant Andrew Baldwin 
("defendant") is a physician. Appellee Susan Baldwin 
("plaintiff") is a psychiatric nurse. Shortly before she met 
defendant in 1985, plaintiff abandoned her first marriage, 
complaining that her husband did not meet her emotional needs. 
In 1987 she became pregnant with defendant's first child and made 
arrangements to abort her pregnancy. Defendant persuaded 
plaintiff to get married and have the child instead. They were 
married on September 18, 1987. This was defendant's first 
marriage. Their son, Will, was born May 23, 1988. Two more 
children were born to the marriage, Barbara and Andrew. At the 
time of trial, the children were aged 5, 2 and 1, respectively. 
Beginning in 1990, defendant was employed by FHP Health 
Care as a critical care physician in the intensive care units at 
St. Mark's Hospital and Holy Cross Hospital in Salt Lake City. 
His position as the attending physician allowed him to spend most 
of the day at home with the children, responding by telephone to 
questions from the hospital. R. 2967. 
2 
Late in 1.991, plaintiff :nr.* defendant discussed moving 
t o t h e Detroit, Michigan area. - r-: r • •• plaintiff's 
encouragement, defendant- Lender* • - 1 
accepted a position as an assistant professor y medicine a*: 
Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan ; -
parties' third fluid, Andrew, was boin Ju 
signed a verified complaint for divorce against defendant ^ . ;.i.y 
6, 1992. On July .^ 992, completely unaware that plaintiff was 
seeking a di vorce, defendant traveled to Mi chigan t:< :» make an 
offer on a home that the parties had selected together.1 
R. 2987. On ' I), 1994, after defendant had made this offer, 
plaintiff cal - defendant and informed him that sh 
for divorce and taken the children to Ohio 2 R 2987-89. 
Defendant immediately returned to Utah and 
unsuccessful ly attempted to regain his position at FHP. 
Plaintiff returned with the children approximately two weeks 
1 ate to it: €' zoned ] e defends lit rented idoirri nii i iirt f o r 
both parties to use as a second residence ^;3-90 F< He 
first month of this arrangement, defendant ypically spent the 
marital residence with the younger children Occasionally 
wniie planning the divorce, plaintiff went on a house 
hunting trip to Michigan, applied for a Michigan nursing license, 
instructed defendant to make an offer on a specific home, and 
filled out the mortgage application, with no intention of moving 
to Michigan. R, 2649 and R. 2980-87. 
2 plaintiff also sought temporary custody of the chili n. 
Neither her verified complaint nor her verified motion for 
temporary custody contained a single negative allegation against 
defendant. Her representations to the Court, however, changed 
dramatically as the case developed. 
3 
defendant stayed in the marital residence with all three children 
while plaintiff stayed alone at the condominium. R. 2991-92. 
Each morning, defendant and Will went back to the marital 
residence to spend the day with all of the children. 
On the afternoon of August 17, 1992, defendant advised 
plaintiff that he would never voluntarily relinquish custody of 
the children. Plaintiff responded that if he did not do so, he 
"would never withstand the scrutiny," a statement that defendant 
understood, correctly, as it turned out, to be a threat to his 
character and reputation. R. 3000-01. 
Plaintiff immediately began to falsely portray 
defendant as violent, abusive and mentally ill, in stark contrast 
to her earlier descriptions of him in counseling as a "kind" man 
who was a "good husband and a good father."3 R. 2628 and 2773. 
On August 18, 1992, when defendant arrived at the house with 
Will, he discovered that plaintiff had changed the locks on the 
family's residence, locking both him and Will out of the house. 
On the same day, plaintiff sought a restraining order against 
defendant, claiming "fear" that defendant would physically harm 
her and the children.4 Ex. 17. 
The Court immediately granted the restraining order, 
denying defendant access to the marital residence until 
3
 Shortly before filing for divorce, plaintiff told her 
counselor that defendant "rarely gets angry with me." Ex. 23. 
4
 Plaintiff claimed that her "fear" had begun seven months 
before when defendant repelled a burglar from the family home 
while plaintiff and the children slept. This was the first 
mention of fear by plaintiff, and it came eleven days after she 
asked defendant to keep all three children overnight at least 
once a week and to help bathe and put the children to bed every 
evening before departing. Ex. 23, p. 26 and R. 2664-65. 
4 
September 4, 1 992. At that time, defendant discovered that his 
medical office had been ransacked, with patient files and. 
persona] effects si: ;i ewn abou! , u\. <;M" tfH 0 00 i n casti and 
diamonds which defendant had received from his mother had been 
taken Plaintiff later admitted searching tihe office and taking 
docuineni b , one a I. win i < ,li wdin a 1 Lered HOY,! pi:oi"luoed aw a t r i a ] 
exhibit. R. 3232-36 and Ex. 53„ Plaintiff never accounted for 
the cash u diamonds. 
( aptenibei "I o , i ^'92 I, It^ '".YUJI, l, .JIWaided L.emporary 
custody of the children to plaintiff. 
3. The Custodial Evaluation, r* Elizabeth Stewart 
conducted a. custodial evaluati - t- saw ili<> 
parties twice. She did not see the parties outside of her 
office, and she never saw plaintiff alone with the children. 
;258. As r>art- of her evaluation, Di WtuwaiL gave Una par Lies 
: h-r Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-IT ("MMPI-II") , a 
psych atric test that is relied on widely by the psychiatric 
profession, and the Rotter Sentence Completion Test, a simple 
exercise requiring the parties to complete unfinished sentences. 
Dr. Stewart submitted the parties' MMPI results for 
third-party analysis, and she received a narrative report 
indicating that defendant's profile was. norma] in all respects. 
ci-x.. 2. rxctinLj.j-j.-e profile, however, was profoundly abnormal. 
T
^ disclosed that she had been dishonest on, the test, avoiding 
answers to questions that she thought would indicate personal 
probl ems a nci fa i I iaiqs , N e v e r t h e l e s s , pi ai rit: \ f:f ilranonst r a t e d a 
"4-9" psychopathic deviate profile, which i s a well-understood 
personality disorder characterized by impulsiveness, 
5 
manipulativeness, unsatisfiable dependency needs, a tendency 
toward family and marital problems, vulnerability to frustration, 
an inability to appreciate personal failings, pathologic blaming 
of others, and an inability to change.5 Ex. 3 and R. 3151. 
Dr. Stewart discarded both MMPI profiles, instead 
relying on her subjective impressions of the parties.6 R. 2303 
(!f[E]ither I had to assume the interview was incorrect, or the 
test was incorrect. And I concluded that the test was in 
error.") Describing the parties in terms that were wholly 
inconsistent with their conduct and their psychiatric profiles, 
Dr. Stewart recommended that plaintiff be awarded custody of the 
children. 
4. Plaintiff's temporary custody of the children. 
During her fifteen month tenure as temporary custodian of the 
children, plaintiff was completely overwhelmed, describing her 
home as "chaos" and complaining to her therapist that she was 
being "victimized" by her four-year-old son.7 R. 3283 and Ex. 
23, p. 36. She became alarmingly dependent on surrogate care, 
5
 Dr. Mirow, a psychiatrist who was acquainted with both 
parties, testified that she would be "very concerned" about the 
person that produced plaintiff's profile, R. 2786-87, and that 
people with this kind of profile "look very, very good, they are 
smooth." R. 2398. Dr. Stewart admitted that plaintiff's psycho-
pathic deviate score places her above the 90th percentile of the 
reference population. R. 2398. 
6
 Subsequent events proved her impressions to be terribly 
wrong. 
7
 Her problems with the children were apparent to almost 
every witness. Dr. Goldsmith, a psychologist that saw plaintiff 
with Will, said nothing positive about plaintiff's parenting 
skills. Dr. Stewart testified that plaintiff was overwhelmed by 
the children, R. 2360, as did plaintiff's therapist, Margaret 
Thompson. Ex. 23. 
6 
leaving the children at day care almost every day °ven on her 
days off, while denying defendant's repeated requests to allow 
1: 0. 
During this period, plaintiff unnecessarily moved twice 
within a year , once immediately after advising the Court: and Dr. 
Stewa] : t that she had just: renewed tiie lease in lief" "  \o\ rely" hoine 
to ensure that the children would have a stable environment. 
Ex. 19 and R. 2 707, Making good on her threat - .- malign 
defendant; ' s unblemished i.epnt, atn un, who i:ai I •" 
least five times with false complaints against defendant. 
Plaintiff a,,-: explored other tactics, r^v- accused defendant 
l e t ..^ • . : 
declared overnight visitation between defendant and Will 
"inappropriate," suggesting sexual misconduct, R 2756. She 
threatened defendant wi th char ges of misprescribd ng na n coti cs 
R. 2993. She told the children's pediatrician, Dr. Young, that 
defendant was • alcoholic, Ex 26. None of these charges was 
leinoLely subt . i d l e d , were event, I;IHI I. I,y abandoned.8 
Most troubling, plaintiff threatened defendant that she 
would make Will ^ * as he needs • • -e" for hen to ga i n 
custody l : K i ii:
 ( j n " therapyl" and 
described such difficulties v wi behavior that was 
diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"), 
ten WIILULI In. win otedieaLed wilit increasing dosages < • . , ;alin. 
Dr. Mirow testified that "[defendant] was being pushed 
out as almost a dangerous, almost evil sounding person.... That 
was not accurate There was no reality in that." R. 2764-65. 
7 
5. The trial. A six day trial began in October 1993 
and ended in January 1994. Dr. Stewart's recommendation was 
sixteen months old, and there was virtually no evidence that 
supported plaintiff's parenting abilities. Despite testimony 
from experts that (1) Dr. Stewart's report had serious flaws, (2) 
that plaintiff's psychological profile displayed personality 
disorders that would make her a poor choice for the custody of 
the children, and (3) that her actions were consistent with her 
abnormal profile, and despite extensive testimony from defendant 
and others that the children were well-adjusted and content in 
his custody, the Court awarded plaintiff custody of the children. 
In doing so, the Court failed to acknowledge 
plaintiff's past conduct, her demonstrated moral standards and 
her continuing efforts to obstruct defendant's relationship with 
his children, while at the same time ignoring a large body of 
evidence that showed defendant to be a caring, competent parent 
who was deeply committed to his children. This was clear error. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Court abused its discretion by accepting 
Elizabeth Stewart's stale and badly flawed custody evaluation 
without conducting a reasoned, independent determination of which 
party would best serve the interests of the children. 
Many hours of testimony from defendant and others 
established that defendant had structured his life around his 
children, willingly sacrificing professional opportunities to be 
with them and to care for them. Defendant gave detailed 
testimony about his relationship with each of his children. He 
explained their differences and he introduced many examples of 
the stimulating play and learning exercises he engaged them in. 
8 
He described the limits that he imposes on the children, the 
structure and, when necessary, the discipline. 
Plaintiff's testimony, on the other hand, lacked any 
indication that she had a meaningful relationship with the 
children.9 Instead, she described the problems she was having 
with the children, her extensive need for day care and outside 
help with the children, her need to medicate Will with Ritalin, 
and her own unsatisfied emotional needs. 
The Court ignored this evidence. Virtually every 
finding reflects the Court's unquestioning adoption of Dr. 
Stewart's report. Ignoring facts confirming the accuracy of the 
plaintiff's profoundly abnormal and defendant's healthy 
psychiatric profiles, the Court speculated that plaintiff would 
have more to offer the children, the oldest of whom was five, in 
their teen years. Court's Ruling dated March 2, 1994, p. 5 (R. 
1281). 
2. The Court abused its discretion by ignoring 
mandatory factors that weighed heavily in favor of defendant. 
The Court also ignored statutory factors that must be 
considered in determining the best interests of the children, 
specifically which parent would be more likely to permit frequent 
and continuing contact by the noncustodial parent and the past 
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of the parties, both of 
which were critical in this matter. 
Plaintiff's approach to visitation was to take every 
opportunity to obstruct defendant's relationship with his 
9
 Plaintiff's description of her relationship with the 
children would occupy less then one page of the trial transcript. 
It can be found at R. 2485 and 2489. 
9 
children. This was disregarded by the Court. Most troubling, 
the Court ignored uncontroverted testimony that plaintiff, after 
threatening to make the parties' four-year-old son "as sick as he 
needs to be," carried out her threat by describing such 
behavioral problems to health care providers that Will was 
hastily diagnosed with ADHD and prescribed Ritalin, 
Will's two day care providers, a local merchant and a 
nurse, all of whom were well-acquainted with Will, described him 
as a normal, happy and well-behaved child at day care and in 
defendant's company.10 (Depositions of Katie Slaymaker and 
Gretchen Jervah, admitted at R. 2825; Testimony of Betty 
Campbell, R. 2977; Testimony of Shauna Shiflett, R. 3056). At 
the same time, plaintiff was able to manage Will only with 
increasing dosages of Ritalin. The Court, ignoring plaintiff's 
express threat to harm the boy, defendant's special expertise as 
a physician, and the testimony of these witnesses, found that 
defendant had placed "his own wishes ahead of the best interest 
of his children" by disputing the diagnosis of ADHD and by 
doubting plaintiff's veracity. This was a manifest abuse of 
discretion, and it totally ignored the central component of any 
custody dispute, the children's best interests. 
3. The Court abused its discretion by excluding 
important evidence that went to the heart of this dispute. 
Finally, the Court abused its discretion by making 
erroneous evidentiary rulings, which served as the basis for at 
10
 To supplement his own testimony, defendant provided 
sixteen hours of video tape of Will, unmedicated, playing quietly 
alone and with his siblings during periods of visitation with 
defendant. R. 3393 and Ex. 65. 
10 
least three of the Court's findings, by excluding critical 
rebuttal evidence, and by refusing to consider serious criminal 
activity that occurred during the trial that circumstantially 
implicated plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' CHILDREN TO PLAINTIFF 
The critical issue in any custody case is the best 
interests of the children. Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38 
(Utah 1982); Sec. 30-3-10(1), Utah Code Ann. The court must 
consider many factors, all of which essentially go to the needs 
of the children and the ability of the parents to meet those 
needs. Painter v. Painter. 752 P.2d 907 (Utah App. 1988). Here 
the weight of the evidence showed that defendant's ability to 
meet the needs of his children, and his commitment to doing so, 
far exceeded plaintiff's. 
A review of the record shows that plaintiff continued 
to be overwhelmed by her children, that she was unable to meet 
their physical or emotional needs, and that her conduct was 
wholly consistent with her grossly abnormal psychiatric profile. 
The evidence reveals a glaring absence of any positive testimony, 
regarding her relationship with her children or her parenting 
skills. Even her own expert described her relationship with her 
son as "troubled." Plaintiff is a chronically depressed, 
emotionally disturbed woman who manipulated those around her 
without regard to the consequences. Rather than acknowledging 
her shortcomings, she blamed defendant and her children, accusing 
11 
her four-year-old son of being "manic-depressive"11 and 
"victimizing" her, causing him to needlessly suffer a psychiatric 
diagnosis that may have life-long implications. 
In contrast, the record is replete with evidence that 
defendant's first priority has been and continues to be his 
children, and that he is particularly well-suited to caring for 
them without outside assistance and without the need to 
administer psychiatric medications to any of them. 
Except for findings 6 and 9, which are factual 
recitations, the findings relating to custody (findings 5 through 
25) are either wholly unsupported or substantially outweighed by 
the record. Findings 18, 19 and 20 are based on faulty 
evidentiary rulings. Findings 5 through 11 are discussed as a 
group, and findings 12 through 25 are discussed separately. To 
the extent necessary, the findings are also broken down to enable 
defendant to properly marshal the evidence in support of the 
findings: 
Finding 5. 
Part 1. Susan Baldwin has been the primary caretaker 
of the three minor children throughout the marriage of 
the parties. She was the exclusive caretaker of Will 
from his birth until Barbara's birth on July 31, 1991. 
The evidence supporting this finding is plaintiff's 
testimony and the testimony of Dr. Stewart. R. 2593-97; R. 2950-
53; R. 3105-06. It was sharply disputed. 
Part 2. Shortly after Barbara's birth when the Plain-
tiff discovered she was pregnant for a third time, 
Defendant, at Plaintiff's insistence began providing 
some care for Will. 
11
 Defendant testified that a manic-depressive five-year-
old would be "a case for the textbooks." R. 3020. 
12 
The evidence supporting this finding is plaintiff's 
testimony at R. 2954. The evidence was conflicting on the 
question of which parent was the children's primary caretaker, 
but the findings that defendant provided no child care duties is 
not supported by the record. R. 2499. 
Part 3. While the Defendant provided physical care for 
Will in terms of playing with him and taking him with 
him for various activities, he did not perform any 
other child care duties, such as cooking, cleaning, 
purchasing clothing or food, household chores, taking 
the children to medical appointments or other daily 
activities involved in child care. The Plaintiff 
provided all of these services for all three children. 
The Defendant at no time provided care for either 
Barbara or Andrew. 
The evidence supporting this finding is plaintiff's 
testimony at R. 2593-97. Dr. Stewart also stated that defendant 
"played" with Will while plaintiff ran the house. R. 3104. 
Finding 6. Finding 6 is not disputed. 
Finding 7. After each of the children was born, Will 
in 1988, Barbara in 1991 and Andrew in June of 1992, 
the Defendant left town leaving the Plaintiff to cope 
by herself with the problems of a new child, and after 
Barbara's birth, with children who were already resid-
ing in the home. This occurred despite the fact that 
the date of each child's birth was known in advance. 
The Defendant put pursuit of his own interests ahead of 
those of providing care for the children (Will, or Will 
and Barbara) when Barbara and Andrew were born. 
This recitation of factual events is supported by the 
record at R. 2318, 2367, 2414-15; R. 2500-02, 2506-08, 2641-45; 
R. 2936-40. There is nothing in the record to support the 
finding that defendant left plaintiff to cope with a newborn 
child "by herself." 
Finding 8. Each of the parties can provide some per-
sonal care for the children, but it is the Plaintiff 
who has a history of using her time to provide personal 
care for the children while the Defendant has used this 
time for his own pursuits. 
13 
The evidence in support of this finding is the 
testimony of plaintiff, R. 2593-97, and the testimony of 
Elizabeth Stewart, R. 3105-06. 
Finding 9. Finding 9 is not disputed. 
Finding 10. 
Part 1. Defendant has never provided personal care for 
Barbara and Andrew for longer than a weekend which 
occurred during the pendency of this matter. 
This finding is a reiteration of Findings 5 and 8. It 
reflects by Dr. Stewart's 1992 recommendation. Ex. 1, p. 22. 
Part 2. In addition, Defendant has, during the pen-
dency of this matter, frequently changed his visits as 
he accepted work assignments around the country. 
There was no evidence to support this finding. 
Part 3. He was unable to identify a future work sched-
ule in court. He stated it would be unpredictable. 
Consequently, Defendant's theoretical ability to pro-
vide personal care is questionable. 
On the last day of trial, defendant was unable to 
recite his future work schedule in court, R. 3346. He never said 
his future work schedule was "unpredictable." 
Finding 11. 
Part 1. The Defendant has never provided personal care 
for Barbara or Andrew while the Plaintiff has regularly 
scheduled her shifts to provide custodial care for all 
three children. 
This is a reiteration of Findings 5, 8 and 10. 
Part 2. During the pendency of the matter the 
Defendant would not accept regularly scheduled 
visitation because he declared his work prohibited him 
from doing so. 
Defendant refused to accept "regularly scheduled" 
visitation when it coincided exactly with his work schedule. 
This was no accident; shortly after defendant had given plaintiff 
14 
a schedule of his employment two months in advance, plaintiff 
"scheduled" defendant's visitation on all of his working 
weekends, effectively denying him contact with his children. 
R. 3030. 
Part 3. His uncertain and irregular schedule with 
unpredictable times in which to provide personal care 
is a pattern that continued throughout the pendency of 
this action. 
This finding is not supported by the record. 
Part 4. In addition, the Plaintiff testified that when 
he had personal time free during the course of the 
marriage, while the parties resided together, Defendant 
frequently used this for research and writing rather 
than providing care for the children. The Defendant 
did not dispute this testimony regarding his use of his 
time. 
Plaintiff's testimony on this issue is at R. 2500, 
2506-07. Defendant disputed this by showing a commitment to his 
children beginning before they were born. It was defendant who 
dissuaded plaintiff from aborting Will. It was defendant who 
began collecting toys for the children prior to their births. It 
was defendant who painstakingly hand-painted hundreds of wooden 
blocks for his children, R. 3046 and Ex. 36, and it was defendant 
who constructed the array of hanging bells for Barbara and Andy. 
R. 3198 and Ex. 50. Even more important, while defendant 
welcomed every opportunity to care for the children, plaintiff 
proved herself to be incapable of caring for them on her own. 
The essence of Findings 5 through 11 is twofold: 
(1) plaintiff was the primary caretaker of the children, and 
(2) defendant was largely disinterested in the children. The 
court attempted to buttress this by finding that defendant 
provided care for Will only at plaintiff's "insistence," and that 
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defendant's care consisted primarily of play while plaintiff 
performed the household chores- The weight of the evidence does 
not support the specifics of these findings, or their essence. 
Regarding which parent was the primary caretaker of the 
children, the testimony concerning the time prior to the parties' 
separation was conflicting. Plaintiff asserted that defendant 
may have "helped" with child care duties. Defendant testified 
that household duties were shared. Plaintiff did the cooking. 
Defendant washed the dishes and cleaned up after meals. 
Defendant bathed Will and almost always put him to bed. R. 2952-
54. 
In the sixteen months in which plaintiff had temporary 
custody of the children, however, her patterns of child care 
clearly established that she was not giving the children personal 
care. Instead, she was leaving the children at day care on her 
days off while repeatedly denying defendant contact with his 
children. R. 3031. Rather than using his time for "his own 
pursuits," defendant willingly sacrificed a medical school 
professorship that he had sought for two years to be with his 
children. 
More important than who performed household chores is 
the parties' level of interest and commitment to their children. 
The Court suggested that defendant is neither capable nor willing 
to make his children a priority, while going far in its efforts 
to reach the opposite conclusion for plaintiff. The record, 
however, is replete with evidence of defendant's caring and 
successful relationship with his children. See discussion of 
Findings 18 and 19, infra. In contrast, there was virtually no 
16 
positive testimony from plaintiff regarding her relationship with 
the children. 
While she had temporary custody of the children, 
plaintiff used vast amounts of day care, sixty hours per month 
beyond what was needed to cover the hours she worked. Ex. 6, 9, 
55. Defendant was astonished that plaintiff would leave the 
children in day care on her days off while refusing his requests 
to care for them. R. 3050. The children spent so much time in 
day care that they saw their mother little more than defendant, 
who was allowed to take them only on alternating weekends. Ex. 
55 and tr. 6, pp. 89-90 (R. 3339-40). At no time did plaintiff 
offer contradictory evidence on this issue. 
As to defendant leaving after the births of the 
children, the record can not support the Court's conclusion that 
defendant put his own pursuits ahead of those of his family. The 
birth of each child occurred at unavoidable times of transition 
for the family, such as a move associated with a change of jobs 
or defendant's medical certification examinations. R. 2937-38. 
These were not fishing trips. Defendant was present for the 
birth of each child, and he insured that plaintiff had recovered 
from childbirth and had surrogate care available to her before 
attending to other needs of the family. R. 2502. The necessity 
of each trip was discussed by the parties and agreed to in 
advance. Plaintiff testified that "intellectually, I could 
understand what he was saying, that he needed to go and find a 
house so we wouldn't arrive in Baltimore and not have a home." 
R. 2496. When asked about defendant's leaving after the births 
of the first two children, Dr. Stewart testified that the trips 
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were vital to the economic security of the family and should not 
be criticized. R. 2413-14. 
Regarding defendant's work schedule, defendant never 
said his work schedule was "unpredictable."12 The Court may 
have confused plaintiff's testimony, in which she said that her 
scheduling was "very erratic," for defendant's. R. 3428. 
Although defendant could not recite his work schedule to the 
Court on January 10, 1994, he had no reason to fix his work 
schedule. Only his visitation schedule had to be fixed, and it 
was. This finding implies that plaintiff had a more stable work 
schedule than defendant, which was not true. Plaintiff and 
defendant both worked irregular schedules, which would preclude 
either from a fixed schedule of visitation. R. 3426 (plaintiff 
could be required to work any day or evening). 
Rather than having a "questionable" ability to care for 
his children, defendant testified that his work schedule was 
totally at his discretion. R. 3009. Defendant testified that he 
could easily coordinate his shifts with the children's school and 
child care, and that he would likely limit himself to three 
shifts per week to maximize his time with his children. R. 3009-
10, 3242-43. The Court abused its discretion in using 
defendant's discretionary work schedule to suggest that his 
parenting ability was "questionable." 
Finally, there is no evidence that defendant 
"frequently changed his visits" to accommodate his work schedule. 
12
 Defendant's only use of the word "unpredictable" was in 
describing a typical on-call day at FHP, where he worked from 
1989 to 1992. R. 2968. 
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Plaintiff's counsel's suggested to defendant that he had changed 
visitation "numerous" times, but defendant disputed this 
assessment. R. 3347. Plaintiff did not testify on this issue. 
Finding 12. 
Part 1. In determining the stability of the environ-
ment provided by each parent, the Plaintiff is clearly 
capable of supplying a much more stable environment 
than is the Defendant. 
This finding is derived from Dr. Stewart's testimony. 
R. 2883; R. 3105-07. It is discussed following the recitation of 
parts 4 and 5 of this finding. 
Part 2. Dr. Elizabeth Stewart, the only mental health 
professional who examined both the parties and their 
children on behalf of the court, was clear and unequiv-
ocal in testifying that it was the Plaintiff who could 
provide a stable, emotional environment for the chil-
dren, not the Defendant. 
This finding recites an opinion that Dr. Stewart 
reached almost a year-and-a-half before trial, based on two brief 
interviews in her office. R. 2260-62, 2332-33. Unfortunately, 
the sixteen months which elapsed after Dr. Stewart saw the 
parties proved her to be totally wrong, and by ignoring these 
events the Court's finding is in error. This is discussed in 
detail following the recitation of part 4. 
Part 3. The behavior of the parties in the court dur-
ing the trial confirmed the information provided by 
Dr. Stewart. The Plaintiff remained calm and provided 
information for the court. The Defendant became highly 
agitated and had difficulty keeping himself under 
control. On occasion the court had to admonish him or 
request the assistance of his counsel in keeping the 
Defendant under control so that the proceedings could 
continue. The Plaintiff presented non-accusatory 
information to the court about the experiences and 
parenting of the parties. The Defendant was accusatory 
and attacked the Plaintiff. 
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On the last day of trial, during Dr. Goates's cross 
examination, plaintiff's counsel asked Dr. Goates whether Will's 
pediatrician had done a sufficient workup to confirm Will's 
diagnosis of ADHD. Defendant unconsciously shook his head "no," 
and the Court admonished him as follows: 
Dr. Baldwin, I wonder if we could get you to 
sit in some kind of decorous, professional 
way. It's not impressive to me to have you 
shake your head and make nonverbal gestures. 
R. 3387. This was the only time the Court "admonished" 
defendant, and counsel was never asked to keep defendant "under 
control." 
Similarly, there is no evidence that defendant was 
accusatory, or that he "attacked" plaintiff. As to who 
criticized and attacked whom, consider: 
(1) Plaintiff accused defendant of misprescribing 
narcotics, R. 2993-94, a claim she abandoned; 
(2) Plaintiff falsely advised the Court that 
defendant would physically harm her and the children, 
Ex. 17; 
(3) Plaintiff presented forged photocopies of a 
document she had taken from defendant's medical office 
as evidence at trial, stating that she had put the 
original "back in the trash," R. 2857-58; 
(4) Plaintiff falsely claimed that the children 
had been returned from visitation "bruised," R. 2698. 
A medical examination disproved this accusation, R. 
2703-04, and she abandoned it; 
(5) On September 11, 1992, plaintiff made the 
frightening threat to make her own child "as sick as he 
needs to be" to win custody, a threat she carried out. 
R. 3018; 
(6) Plaintiff called the police with false claims 
against defendant several times during the pendency of 
the case, the most well-documented being the carefully 
planned "911" call when she asserted, falsely, that an 
unknown intruder was breaking into her house. R. 2833; 
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(7) Plaintiff, a psychiatric nurse, falsely told 
her therapist that defendant was paranoid, delusional, 
psychotic and schizoid. Ex. 24; 
(8) Plaintiff falsely told Dr. Goldsmith that 
defendant had a "tentative11 relationship with his 
children and that Will was afraid of him. R. 2460; and 
(9) Plaintiff falsely told Dr. Young that defen-
dant was an alcoholic. Ex. 26, p. 3. 
Part 4. In addition, the psychological testing of the 
parties, as described by the mental health profession-
als, as well as the clinical observations by 
Dr. Stewart indicated that while people and relation-
ships are important to the Plaintiff, impersonal ideas 
are important to the Defendant. 
This part of Finding 12 reflects Dr. Stewart's reliance 
on the Rotter Sentence Completion test, a simple fill-in-the-
blank exercise in which the parties complete sentences on a form. 
Ex. 1 and R. 3094. Unlike the MMPI-II, which is virtually 
impossible to "fake," the examinee in the Rotter test consciously 
chooses the themes to express. R. 3092-93. A manipulative 
person, therefore, knowing what themes are expected in a custody 
evaluation, will tailor her responses for the occasion. 
Plaintiff's responses were carefully aimed toward family and 
children. For example, plaintiff's response to !II like ..." was 
"playing with my children," (Ex. 40) (yet she put them in day 
care on her days off) while defendant's response to "I like ..." 
was "to kayak in the jungle." (Ex. 41). 
Dr. Stewart, who analyzed this test herself, embraced 
plaintiff's responses as evidence of her abiding concern for 
family and children and, apparently, as evidence of defendant's 
lack of interest in his children. The Court's adoption of this 
conclusion reflects a conscious disregard of the evidence flatly 
contradicting her assessment. 
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Because this finding reflects the Court's total, 
unquestioning acceptance of Elizabeth Stewart's custody 
evaluation, apparently without even considering the evidence, a 
detailed discussion of the Stewart report, and its deficiencies, 
is necessary. 
a. The report was stale. 
Dr. Stewart's report was sixteen months old at the time 
of the trial. Dr. Stewart had no knowledge of the many 
significant events that occurred after she interviewed the 
parties in September 1992, and she noted that the passage of time 
was critical: "[T]he issue of custody should be based on current 
function."13 R. 3133. This passage of time proved many of Dr. 
Stewart's assessments wrong by the time of trial.14 For 
example: "Mrs. Baldwin's plan to stay at home is better than 
Dr. Baldwin's plan to move away." Ex. 1, p. 7. As previously 
discussed, plaintiff moved shortly after falsely advising Dr. 
Stewart and the Court that she had just renewed her lease. 
Defendant did not move away as predicted by Dr. Stewart. Also, 
Dr. Stewart concluded, "Mrs. Baldwin is more able to give person-
al rather than surrogate care." Ex. 1, p. 3. From undisputed 
13
 When asked what the effect of placing Andy in defend-
ant's custody would be, Dr. Stewart replied "I don't think I'm in 
a position to say, because I haven't seen Andy for a year." R. 
3121. Dr. Stewart also acknowledged that her assessment could 
change if she learned that plaintiff was having difficulty coping 
with the children (which she was), R. 2382-82, or if she discov-
ered that plaintiff had made numerous false claims against 
defendant (which she had). R. 2417. 
14
 Dr. Stewart made some perceptive errors as well. For 
example, she repeatedly mistook "obsessive" for "depression," 
which caused Dr. Mirow to wonder aloud whether she was hearing 
people correctly. R. 2770. 
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testimony, it was clear that plaintiff resorted to day care, even 
on her days off, to the point that she was home, alone with the 
children, no more than five or six days per month, ex. 6, 9, 55. 
Despite the many events that had proven Dr. Stewart's 
report wrong, the Court accepted it without considering the 
testimony, straining at times to avoid obvious inconsistencies. 
For example, even Dr. Stewart stated that plaintiff was "severely 
taxed" by the children, and would be for several more years. 
Instead of recognizing this, the Court ignored it, stating that 
"the Court must consider not just the parenting skills each 
parent evinces with the children at present, but also what each 
parent can offer the children ... in the children's adolescent 
and teen years." Court's Ruling dated March 2, 1994, p. 5 (R. 
1281). This was a manifest abuse of discretion. 
b. Dr. Stewart's rejection of both MMPI profiles 
undermines the validity of her report. 
Dr. Donald Strassberg15 testified that the MMPI is far 
and away the most frequently used instrument in psychology, 
having been given to thousands of people over forty to fifty 
years. R. 3140-46. Dr. Strassberg testified, and defendant's 
MMPI narrative profile shows, that defendant gave truthful 
responses, R. 3146-47 and Ex. 2, and that his psychiatric profile 
was normal in all respects, R. 148-49 and Ex. 2. 
Plaintiff's profile, on the other hand, revealed a 
deeply disturbed woman who would be a poor choice for the 
Dr. Strassberg is a professor of psychology at the 
University of Utah, R. 3137. Unlike Dr. Stewart, he has pub-
lished many peer-reviewed papers on the MMPI and its interpreta-
tion. R. 3138. 
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guardianship of small children. R. 2786-88. Dr. Strassberg 
testified that plaintiff has a classic "4-9" personality 
disorder, which is characterized by impulsiveness, 
manipulativeness, unsatisfiable dependency needs, a tendency to 
family and marital problems, vulnerability to frustration, 
inability to appreciate failings of self, pathologic blaming of 
others and an inability to change, even in therapy. R. 3150-51. 
Manipulation of clinicians (which would include Dr. Stewart) is 
also a common characteristic of this profile. R. 3153. 
In light of plaintiff's psychiatric profile, and 
defendant's repeated warnings to Dr. Stewart that she was being 
mislead,16 R. 3317-23, Dr. Stewart should have been alerted that 
there were serious problems with plaintiff's credibility. Yet 
Dr. Stewart accepted virtually everything plaintiff told her. 
R. 2330-31 (!1I have to . . . defer to her judgment ... on the basis 
of her experience with him"). 
Dr. Stewart's rejection of the parties' MMPI profiles 
is stunning. Consider the marked contrast between Dr. Stewart's 
observations of each of the parties as compared to their MMPI 
narratives: 
Dr. Stewart was very impressed when, during the inter-
view, plaintiff stood and announced that Will had to go to the 
bathroom. R. 2270. As she led Will, who had been playing at 
defendant's feet, out of the room, defendant told Dr. Stewart 
that Will had said nothing, and that she was being duped. R. 
3320-21. 
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COMPARISON OP STEWART CUSTODY REPORT AND MMPI NARRATIVE 
SUSAN BALDWIN 
Stewart Report (Ex. 1): 
1. Risks and Rewards: 
"She is not afraid to take 
risks which have a high plea-
sure potential." 
2. Social Interaction: 
"Socially Mrs. Baldwin is very 
much at ease with others. Her 
upbeat, 'can-do' manner and 
general efficiency impress 
others as indicative of being 
responsible, forgiving, and 
understanding." 
3. Self Image: 
"While sensitive to what oth-
ers think of her and to her 
own security, she does not 
easily attribute fault or 
blame to other people. She 
worries about the events in 
her life but in a productive 
rather than a ruminative way." 
4. Honesty: 
"She has a tendency at the 
present time to see herself as 
being without blame and always 
motivated to do the correct 
thing. This may be an arti-
fact of the custody evaluation 
inasmuch as she is trying very 
hard to acknowledge no faults 
nor (sic) frailties lf 
5. Therapy Prospects: 
"Although she has used coun-
seling a great deal, she has 
not done so because of insecu-
rity about her own abilities 
MMPI Narrative (Ex. 3): 
"The client is likely to be 
impulsive and immature and 
tends to seek immediate grati-
fication of her wishes, often 
without apparent concern for 
the consequences." 
"Her behavior is primarily 
hedonistic and self-centered, 
and she is quite insensitive 
to the needs of other people, 
manipulating them for her own 
ends and feeling no guilt 
about this." 
"She is likely to project an 
excessively positive self-
image and to be somewhat arro-
gant and intolerant of others' 
feelings. The client is like-
ly to be rigid and inflexible 
in her approach to problems 
and may not be open to psycho-
logical self-evaluation." 
"[T]he client attempted to 
place herself in an overly 
positive light by minimizing 
faults and denying psychologi-
cal problems. This defensive 
stance is characteristic of 
individuals who are trying to 
maintain the appearance of 
adequacy and self-control.... 
"Although she may say she 
wants treatment ... she has 
little or no motivation for 
personal change and is likely 
to enter treatment only to 
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but rather to understand her-
self and others better." 
avoid or reduce external pres-
sure .fl 
COMPARISON OP STEWART CUSTODY REPORT AND MMPI NARRATIVE 
ANDREW BALDWIN 
Stewart Report (Ex. 1): 
1. Truthfulness: 
"The MMPI ... shows strong 
denial of any depressive symp-
toms ." "[H]e was trying to 
produce a sane MMPI and over-
did it." R. 2309. 
2. Interpersonal Relations: 
"Dr. Baldwin is not socially 
inclined and, in fact, he 
feels some discomfort with 
others." 
3. Emotional Stability: 
"mood disorder" 
"depression" (ten times) 
4. Other observations: 
"rigid" 
"insensitive to the emotional 
needs of other people" 
"a potential threat ... there 
is some question whether Mrs. 
Baldwin's concern about her 
safety was undue." 
"vulnerable to frustration" 
"high strung and irritable" 
MMPI Narrative (Ex. 2) 
"This is a valid profile. The 
validity items suggest he 
cooperated with the evaluation 
... this is an adequate indi-
cation of his present person-
ality functioning." 
"He appears to meet and talk 
with other people with rela-
tive ease and is not overly 
anxious when in social gather-
ings ." 
Normal. 
Normal. 
Normal. 
Normal. 
Normal. 
Normal. 
Normal. 
Certainly, any psychological test can be inaccurate 17 
17 Dr. Stewart justified her rejection of defendant's 
normal MMPI profile by surmising that he manipulated the test. 
R. 2388. Dr. Strassberg, however, testified that it is virtually 
impossible to do so and that even psychology graduate students 
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Plaintiff's conduct throughout this matter, however, was entirely 
consistent with her psychiatric profile. As examples, 
Dr. Strassberg listed her inability to handle Will, indicating 
low frustration tolerance, R. 3167, the way she planned and 
executed the divorce, indicating manipulativeness and poor 
judgment, R. 3168, her statements about being "victimized" by her 
four-year-old son, indicating a tendency to blame others for her 
failings, R. 3170, and her false statements concerning 
defendant's tendency to violence, illustrating dishonesty. 
R. 3171-72. 
Dr. Strassberg also discussed the problems that could 
be expected in the from a custody award to a person with 
plaintiff's profile. These include the parent being overwhelmed, 
R. 3162, which plaintiff had already demonstrated, decisions 
being made without considering the interests of the children, and 
nonfulfillment of the children's emotional needs caused by 
pathologic dependency needs. R. 3162-63. 
c. Dr. Stewart disregarded serious problems that 
plaintiff was having with Will. 
Dr. Stewart noted, but disregarded, remarkable 
differences in the way Will interacted with each of his parents. 
Defendant and Will met with Dr. Stewart on August 31, 1992, when 
Will was living with defendant. Will was quiet and content 
during that meeting, and Dr. Stewart made only positive comments, 
noting that Will was "very comfortable with father," enjoying 
can not successfully manipulate the test. R. 3174-75. Dr. 
Stewart's unfamiliarity with the basic principles of the MMPI was 
illustrated when she misnamed the MMPI frequency scale as the 
"falsification scale," R. 2304, a term which, according to 
Dr. Strassberg, does not exist. R. 3174. 
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"good rapport," "on lap playing with father's care, father very 
tolerant." R. 2381. On September 11, 1992, shortly after Will 
had been placed in plaintiff's custody, Dr. Stewart saw Will with 
plaintiff. At this meeting, Dr. Stewart described Will as 
disruptive and "quite demanding." Ignoring the placid and happy 
demeanor that Will had demonstrated in his father's custody, she 
testified at trial that Will had emotional problems.18 R. 2269. 
Dr. Stewart's failure to consider that Will was happy 
and quiet with one parent, and demanding and disruptive with the 
other, undermined the credibility of her report. Beyond that, of 
course, in the ensuing sixteen months plaintiff's difficulties 
with Will worsened, which was not even considered by the Court. 
d. Dr. Stewart erroneously characterized defendant as 
suffering from "depression" and "mood disorders." 
In her report, Dr. Stewart referred to defendant's 
"mood disorders" and "depression" eleven times. Ex. 1. Dr. 
Mirow rejected this diagnosis and was puzzled as to how Dr. 
Stewart got this information. R. 2768-69. Defendant did not 
give Dr. Stewart a history of depression either. R. 3240-41. 
This incorrect information became central to Dr. Stewart's 
report. Her reliance on this "fact" begins in the summary 
section of her report: "[Plaintiff] ... is emotionally more 
stable than Dr. Baldwin, whose history of mood disorders produces 
difficult challenges for him." Ex. 1, p. 1. 
18
 At trial Dr. Stewart said it was "very clear" to her 
that Will had emotional problems when she saw him in September 
1992. R. 2271. This observation differed substantially from her 
report, however, in which she indicated that there were no 
special needs or problems that would set one child apart from the 
others. Ex. 1 and R. 3075-76. 
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After making eleven references to defendant's 
depression, Dr. Stewart ignored plaintiff's well-documented 
history of depression dating to at least 1985. R. 2843. 
Plaintiff discussed her depressive history with Margaret 
Thompson. Ex. 24. She described herself as "chronically 
depressed" to Dr. Mirow. R. 2738. There is no reference to 
these problems in Dr. Stewart's report, however, who instead 
described plaintiff's "upbeat and can-do manner." 
e. Dr. Stewart mischaracterized defendant's offer to 
continue caring for Will as an attempt to separate the siblings. 
In the early months of this case, defendant's only 
priority was to preserve the integrity of the family. At that 
time he had been Will's primary caregiver for over a year. R. 
2954-55. Hoping to salvage his marriage and family, he offered 
to continue this arrangement to relieve plaintiff of her bad 
relationship with Will. Dr. Stewart ignored defendant's 
motivation for this proposal and instead seized upon it as 
demonstrating that defendant had a favored child. Ex. 1, p. 7. 
Even though plaintiff had requested this arrangement, Dr. Stewart 
interpreted it as evidence that "Dr. Baldwin has shown less 
interest in Barbara than he has in Will." Ex. 1, p. 7. She also 
failed to recognize the necessary converse--that plaintiff had 
shown less interest in Will than in Barbara or Andy. 
f. Dr. Stewart strained to portray defendant's 
positive traits as negative, and plaintiff's negative traits as 
positive. 
Dr. Stewart persistently described defendant's positive 
traits in a negative way, and plaintiff's negative traits in a 
positive way. Dr. Strassberg agreed, stating the Dr. Stewart was 
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"unreasonably selective" in the features of the parties' MMPI 
profiles that she chose to pay attention to. R. 3157. For 
example, Dr. Stewart considered defendant's sensitivity to other 
people's expectations as a negative trait.19 R. 3301 (while 
simultaneously characterizing him as insensitive to other 
people's needs. Ex. 1, p. 7). 
Regarding the MMPI testing, Dr. Stewart interpreted 
defendant's "true" response to question 37 of the MMPI as 
evidence of his "vulnerability to frustration." R. 3086. 
Plaintiff's "true" response to the same question, however, was 
ignored. R. 3086-87. Similarly, Dr. Stewart found it important 
to report that defendant allegedly paid little attention to 
Barbara in Dr. Stewart's office on September 11, 1992. Ex. 1. 
At trial, however, Dr. Stewart related that Barbara was "quite 
self-sufficient," R. 2270, requiring very little attention from 
either parent. Dr. Stewart also failed to report that plaintiff 
gave no attention to Andy whatsoever, who was fed and held by 
defendant throughout the interview. R. 2377. In other words, as 
to identical facts, one was important, the other ignored, 
depending on whether the predetermined conclusion was supported. 
g. Dr. Stewart's ex parte communications with 
plaintiff's counsel should have disqualified her report. 
Dr. Stewart's report was tainted by her substantive 
ex parte discussions with plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Dolowitz. R. 
19
 When forced to allow that defendant had any positive 
traits, Dr. Stewart managed to present them as additional handi-
caps: (1) He has sophisticated humor, which he uses to maintain 
emotional distance from other people. (2) He is accurate with 
facts and details, which is socially problematic. (3) He is a 
well-motivated person, not by the ioy of planning, work, and 
accomplishment, but by fear of failure. Ex. 1, pp. 6-7. 
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2220. The special risk to Dr. Stewart's objectivity in this case 
is the nature of Mr. Dolowitz's statements concerning defendant, 
a man he had not yet met. On August 19, 1992, seeking a 
restraining order against defendant, Mr. Dolowitz personally 
represented to the Court that "Defendant's behavior has 
demonstrated that the Defendant may physically injure the 
Plaintiff ... and the children."20 Mr. Dolowitz delivered this 
document to Dr. Stewart on August 28, 1992, before Dr. Stewart 
met defendant. Mr. Dolowitz also had numerous telephone 
conversations with Dr. Stewart, telling her that defendant was on 
Prozac, which was incorrect, that defendant had attempted to 
terminate plaintiff's phone service, which was incorrect, and 
that defendant had cancelled visitation, which was also 
incorrect. R. 2245-46. 
Although Dr. Stewart listed her contacts and procedures 
in her final report, including her discussions with Dr. Mirow, 
Margaret Thompson and the children's pediatrician, R. 2239-41, 
she failed to disclose her communications with Mr. Dolowitz, 
giving defendant no opportunity to respond to Mr. Dolowitz's 
statements about him. R. 2245-46. It was only when defendant's 
counsel requested additional files from Dr. Stewart, two months 
after Dr. Stewart's final report was submitted to the court, that 
defendant discovered evidence of these ex parte communications. 
Part 5. The children must be raised in an environment 
where they and their relationships to their parents, 
their peers, their families and each other are impor-
tant. The Plaintiff is the parent who can create an 
environment in which these will be emphasized, main-
20
 Attorney's Certification for Temporary Restraining Order 
dated August 19, 1992, para. 4 (R. 67-69). 
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tained and taught. These are extremely important in 
the emotional stability of the environment maintained 
for the children. A custodial parent must provide com-
fort and security for a child and by personal care and 
using friends in a social environment, the Plaintiff 
has given the children an environment of adult caring. 
The Defendant did not provide such an environment and 
is unable to do so. 
This finding is supported by Dr. Stewart's testimony at 
R. 2277, where she indicates that she thought plaintiff was "very 
empathetic," and that defendant "doesn't sense a lot of the 
feelings that other people have."21 The finding that plaintiff 
was better able to provide a "stable, emotional environment" of 
adult caring" could only be reached by disregarding the facts. 
The vast majority of "adult caring" given to the children, at 
least when they were in the custody of plaintiff, was day care. 
Plaintiff has a long history of mental instability, she has 
abandoned two marriages, and she has been in various emotional 
treatments since at least 1985. R. 2843. She sought to abort 
Will, and she considered the same fate for her third child, 
Andy.22 R. 2931 and 2503. 
Finding 13. While defendant clearly loves all the 
children and has a great deal to offer these children, 
the court finds that he is not equally bonded to the 
three children. Dr. Stewart clearly opined that 
Plaintiff would make the better custodial parent for 
21
 Dr. Mirow disputed this assessment of defendant, testi-
fying that "he's playful, thoughtful, interactive, quite adept at 
reaching other people emotionally. And he is able to use his 
knowledge and his understandings, both to play and to learn in a 
very healthy way. Which would make him a pretty good parent." 
R. 2749. 
22
 Dr. Goates, a psychiatrist, considered this fact partic-
ularly important, indicating that the mother of an unwanted child 
may view that child as "damaged goods," creating a negative 
relationship between herself and the child, R. 3278, which was 
evidenced by plaintiff's complaints to her therapist that she was 
being "victimized" by her four-year-old son. R. 2843. 
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the three children and is strongly and equally bonded 
to all three. The Court finds this testimony to be 
credible. 
The unsupport statement on parent-child bonding is 
discussed at Finding 19, infra. 
Finding 14. The court was advised by Dr. Stewart that 
she is very concerned when one parent alienates chil-
dren from the other parent. She found, and the court 
has determined from the testimony of the parties and 
their conduct in court that Dr. Stewart correctly 
observed that the Defendant works to alienate the chil-
dren from the Plaintiff by fault finding, criticism and 
derogatory comments. On the other hand, the Plaintiff 
does not engage in this behavior. 
Plaintiff testified that defendant once accused her of 
being a "poor role model" in Will's presence. R. 2516. Dr. 
Stewart's incorrect assumption that defendant would alienate the 
children from plaintiff was not based on any direct evidence. 
Instead, it was based on a single incident at the custodial 
interview. There, plaintiff stated that she thought extensive 
and flexible visitation was appropriate. Recalling plaintiff's 
deposition the previous week, however, in which plaintiff had 
suggested that defendant was mentally ill and should have no 
contact with his children, defendant called this discrepancy to 
Dr. Stewart's attention. R. 3317-18. Dr. Stewart characterized 
plaintiff's dramatic change in position "a matter of wording 
differences, not substantive differences," R. 2261, and told 
defendant he was being "hypertechnical." Defendant then annoyed 
Dr. Stewart by questioning her competence. R. 3318. Based on 
defendant's directness, Dr. Stewart wrongly concluded that 
defendant would be "antagonistic" toward plaintiff in front of 
the children, and this became the basis of finding 14. 
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The evidence in contrast to this finding is Defendant's 
testimony in which he stated that he never used derogatory terms 
about plaintiff in front of the children. R. 3194. As to 
plaintiff's fault finding, criticism, and derogatory comments 
about defendant, please refer to the discussion of Finding 12, 
part 3, supra. 
Finding 15. The Court found the defendant's testimony 
concerning the Park City outing to be particularly 
significant in this context. "When defendant, en route 
to Park City, experienced problems with his vehicle, he 
walks in distance in the sun/heat with the children, 
decided to keep the children with him overnight and 
chose not to call the plaintiff directly to seek 
assistance with the children, or to advise her of where 
he and the children were and what his plans were. 
Defendant's testimony regarding the Park City outing is 
at R. 3037-42. Defendant notified plaintiff, via another 
physician, that he was having problems with his automobile, which 
he was, and that he would return the children the following day, 
which he did. Id. 
Finding 16. The 911 tape was considered compelling by 
the Court. The content and tone of the tape reflected 
an alarming degree of persistence, angry demands, 
intense poundings on the doors, and chaos, at the home, 
to which the children were insensitively subjected. 
While both parents might well have handled this 
situation differently, keeping the best interests of 
the children at the forefront of their minds, it is 
particularly clear that defendant lost control and 
forgot what was best for the children. 
The 911 tape is Exhibit 31. The evidence was that 
plaintiff was expecting defendant to arrive at her home at 10:00 
p.m. to pick up Will to take him to a drive-in movie. Plaintiff 
testified that she knew defendant would arrive at that time to 
pick up Will. R. 2831. He arrived at plaintiff's residence at 
approximately 9:50 p.m. Plaintiff's car was in the driveway and 
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the lights were on. He knocked. There was no answer, but a dog 
began to bark from inside the house. Defendant became alarmed 
because he knew plaintiff did not own a dog. R. 2915-17. 
Fearing that something could be wrong inside the house, 
defendant knocked more persistently and began calling for Will. 
Plaintiff was inside the house, ignoring defendant. R. 2832. 
She called 911, feigning to the police that an unknown intruder 
was "breaking into" the house.23 R. 2833. There is no evidence 
that defendant "lost control." When the police arrived, no 
action was taken, except that plaintiff did successfully deny 
defendant visitation that evening. R. 2918. 
Finding 17. Defendant acknowledged, while on the 
stand, that the plaintiff has been flexible regarding 
visitation in the past. 
Defendant said that plaintiff had "sometimes" been 
flexible with visitation. R. 3022. This single statement does 
not reflect plaintiff's approach to visitation, which is 
discussed at Part II of this brief, infra. 
Finding 18. Dr. Stewart described the difference 
between playing with and entertaining the children as 
opposed to providing every day structure and care. She 
testified that the structure a care giver would give 
would produce more resistance from a child than would 
simply playing with the child, yet this care giver 
providing structure would be providing more attention 
to the children than someone who simply played with the 
children. The Plaintiff is aware of the problems that 
arise from her providing structure for the children. 
The Defendant, not providing this type of structure, 
does not encounter this type of difficulty. The Plain-
tiff provides limits for the children and this produces 
conflicts. The Defendant does not. Instead of recog-
nizing that this is a problem, the Defendant simply 
criticizes the Plaintiff to the children, which is a 
23
 After admitting to the police that it "might be my ex-
husband, " plaintiff falsely informed them that defendant had 
"broken into my house before." Ex. 31. 
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de-stabilizing factor in their lives. The lack of this 
criticism in the home of Mrs. Baldwin is one of the 
stabilizing factors in the children's lives as it 
leaves them free to form an unfettered relationship 
with their father. Dr. Baldwin does not permit the 
children this freedom in their relationship with Mrs. 
Baldwin. This conduct by Dr. Baldwin is detrimental to 
the children. 
The evidence supporting this finding again is Dr. 
Stewart's testimony, which was based on two brief interviews a 
year-and-a-half before trial. R. 3104-08. There was no evidence 
that plaintiff provided any limits or structure for the children. 
She described her five-year-old son as a hyperactive "special 
needs" child, R. 2865, but she gave him slingshots to play with 
without supervision. R. 2836. She testified that Will needs 
"one-on-one" time, R. 2559, but she left him at day care on her 
days off. Ex. 6, 9, 55. 
Defendant testified at length about the time he spends 
with his children and the things they do together. Examples are 
constructing paper bracelets, working on jigsaw puzzles, playing 
chess, playing checkers, learning to use a computer, learning 
colors, letters and numbers with antique license plates, R. 3049, 
learning to sew, making kites, camping out in the back yard, 
painting rocks for gifts to family members, cooking dinner 
together, watching planes at the airport, going to the park and 
making framed pictures. R. 3326-35 and exhibits 37, 38, 49, 54 
and 65. Plaintiff did none of these things with the children, or 
anything else that can be discerned from her testimony. 
Defendant also described the rules and structure that 
he provided for his children, painfully relating two incidents in 
which he had to discipline his son for stepping off the curb 
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without checking for traffic. He described the "red tape" rule, 
where household items that posed potential hazards, e.g., 
electrical outlets, were carefully marked with red tape to 
designate that they were off-limits to children. R. 3216 and 
visible in Ex. 40. The Court's finding that defendant does not 
place limits on the children is particularly disturbing because 
the Court cut short his testimony on this issue. See Section III 
of this brief, infra. Nevertheless, the only party who testified 
regarding the limits and structure that was given to the children 
was defendant. 
Finding 19. Will is strongly bonded with both parents. 
Andrew and Barbara have strong bonding with the Plain-
tiff and weak bonding with the Defendant. The Defen-
dant has not demonstrated an ability to provide care 
and supervision in a suitable environment for the 
children and meet their needs for a prolonged period of 
time. The Plaintiff has demonstrated an ability to 
provide care and supervision in a suitable environment 
for the children and meet their needs throughout their 
lives. 
The finding on parent-child bonding is unsupported by 
the record.24 Regarding defendant's ability to provide care for 
the children, Dr. Stewart's preposterous opinion was that 
defendant was unaware of what the care of an infant entailed,25 
even though it was defendant who fed and cared for the baby 
throughout the interview. Ex. 1. 
24
 Dr. Stewart admitted that she was in no position to make 
any conclusion as to the current level of bonding between the 
parties and the children. R. 3127. 
25
 Dr. Mirow disputed Dr. Stewart's assessment, pointing 
out that defendant's duties as an intensive care physician were 
"very similar" to those of taking care of a baby. R. 2778. 
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The testimony revealed that only defendant had a deep, 
meaningful bond with each of the children.26 He developed this 
bond through extraordinary efforts. Unlike plaintiff, defendant 
discussed in detail the way he interacted with each of his 
children, even the infant, Andy, whom defendant frequently 
carried around like a papoose. He took the children to the flea 
market virtually every weekend because each of the children 
enjoyed it for different reasons. R. 3045. He took them to see 
the mine at Kennecott, and to Hill Air Force Base to see the 
airplanes. Id. He covered an entire wall of a room in his house 
with white felt so that the children could play "stick-um" with 
the colored pieces of felt he gave them. R. 3050 and Ex. 39. 
Finding 20. The Defendant attempted to involve Will in 
the custodial dispute. He has advised Will that he 
(Will) will be placed in the Defendant's custody, thus 
trying to impact Will's preference for which parent he 
would reside. The Plaintiff has engaged in no such 
activity. This activity is considered to be seriously 
detrimental to Will. 
There was no evidence on which the court could have 
based such a finding. Plaintiff attempted to testify that Will 
told her that defendant told him he was going to be placed in 
defendant's custody. R. 2561. Over defendant's hearsay 
objection, the court admitted it as evidence of the child's state 
of mind, but not for the truth of the statement.27 Id. This 
26
 Dr. Mirow testified that defendant was "easily a person 
who can be with small children on a nonverbal level," R. 2779. 
27
 The Court's evidentiary rulings on the child's "state of 
mind" apparently depended on who was testifying. When defendant 
attempted to testify why Will thought he could not live with 
defendant, for the purpose of showing that plaintiff had involved 
the children in the dispute, the Court ruled that the child's 
state of mind was irrelevant. R. 3194-95. When defendant 
attempted to testify as to why Will thought he had to take his 
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finding, which accepted the statement as substantive evidence, is 
contrary to the Court's evidentiary ruling, and it is 
inappropriate. 
Finding 21. The law favors keeping siblings together. 
The Defendant initially wanted custody of Will but not 
Barbara or Andy. His position changed only as he went 
into trial, apparently after determining that he would 
not be able to successfully secure a separation of the 
children. These three children should be kept together 
in a family unit. The Plaintiff has sought custody of 
all three children throughout this action and has con-
stantly maintained the position that the children 
should be kept together in a family unit. 
Except for the statement that "the law favors keeping 
siblings together,11 this finding is wrong. In his first plead-
ing, defendant sought custody of all three children: "Based on my 
professional opinion of plaintiff's emotional state, I believe 
that the safety and physical well-being of my minor children is 
at risk, and that it is imperative that an order be entered 
immediately awarding me the custody of our three minor 
children...." Affidavit of William Andrew Baldwin in Support of 
Cross Motion for Temporary Custody dated August 19, 1992, para. 
17 (R. 36-48) (emphasis added) (judicial notice of all pleadings 
was taken by the Court at R. 2660). He never proposed the 
separation of the siblings except as an alternative, temporary 
measure when he believed reconciliation was likely. Defendant 
testified that "I believed that by doing that, ultimately the 
family would reconcile." R. 3213-14. 
Defendant's alternative proposal was treated by 
plaintiff, by Elizabeth Stewart and by the Court as an attempt to 
separate the siblings. Dr. Mirow indicated that defendant only 
Ritalin, the Court ruled that it was inadmissible hearsay. R. 
3209. 
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wanted to "keep things together in the least disruptive [way] for 
his family." Defendant recognized the importance of keeping 
children together, and he steadfastly sought custody of all three 
children. R. 2780. 
Finding 22. Dr. Stewart advised the court that she 
found the character and emotional stability of Susan 
Baldwin as a custodial parent greatly exceeded that of 
Andrew Baldwin. No credible contrary evidence was 
presented to the court. The court finds that Susan 
Baldwin has, in terms of her character and her emo-
tional stability for providing custodial care for the 
children, emotional stability and an ability to provide 
an emotionally stable environment which greatly exceeds 
that of the Defendant. 
Dr. Stewart's testimony in support of this finding is 
at R. 2293-95 and in her custodial report, Ex. 1. Rather than 
making a reasoned, independent finding based on the evidence, the 
Court blindly accepted Elizabeth Stewart's erroneous 
observations. Contrary to the Court's finding that "no credible" 
evidence was presented that defendant's character and emotional 
stability was at least equal to plaintiff's, Dr. Susan Mirow, a 
psychiatrist that had seen defendant sixteen times, testified 
that defendant is emotionally "quite healthy," and that he is a 
thoughtful, interactive parent that is "quite adept" at reaching 
other people emotionally. R. 2736, 2749, 2768. 
As to the parties' character, the Court heard 
uncontroverted testimony that plaintiff had planned the divorce 
for maximum advantage, inducing defendant to quit his job and 
sending him to Michigan to sign a real estate contract two days 
after she had signed a verified complaint for divorce. Most 
frightening, the Court heard undisputed testimony that plaintiff 
threatened to make Will "as sick as he needs to be" for her to 
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gain custody, and that shortly thereafter Will was being given 
Ritalin for ADHD. R. 3018). Despite the fact that Will 
exhibited no behavioral problems when he was outside of 
plaintiff's presence, plaintiff testified that Will was a 
"special needs child," justifying her complaints that she was 
overwhelmed. 
Finding 23. The Plaintiff has demonstrated throughout 
the lives of the children a major commitment to custo-
dial parenting. The Defendant has engaged in a play-
mate role with his son Will but not even that with the 
other children. While the Plaintiff returned to work 
on a part time basis after the birth of the children, 
the Defendant worked full time and utilized his spare 
time to conduct research for the publication of arti-
cles rather than assisting with the children. In addi-
tion, the Defendant was, until trial, perfectly will-
ing, and in fact, requested the court to separate the 
children. The desire and commitment for custody is 
clearly differentiated between the parties. The Plain-
tiff has sought custody of all the children throughout 
these pleadings, while the Defendant does not. In fact 
he advised the court in his January 10, 1994 testimony 
that he in reality wanted the Plaintiff to raise Barba-
ra and Andy until they reached school age and then he 
would assume physical custody. 
Plaintiff testified at R. 2596 that defendant played 
with Will but not with Barbara. 
Most of this finding repeats Findings 18 and 21, which 
have been discussed above. On January 10, 1994 defendant's 
testimony was that his primary goal was to have custody of all of 
the children, that long blocks of visitation would be appropriate 
until the children entered school, and that alternatively, the 
younger children could reside with plaintiff in a joint physical 
custody arrangement until they entered school. R. 3344. 
Finding 24. The Defendant on several occasions created 
scenes that were emotionally disturbing to the chil-
dren. He physically took the children from the Plain-
tiff in January of 1993 when Plaintiff did not agree to 
that visitation and attempted to take them again with-
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out her agreement in June, 1993. Prior to the filing 
of the divorce, he ran his bicycle into the family car, 
then told Will (untruthfully), who was in the car driv-
en by the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff had hurt him and 
that he had to go to the hospital. Even the Defend-
ant's own witnesses testified that this was totally 
inappropriate behavior. 
This finding reflects plaintiff's testimony at R. 2524-
28 that defendant "took" Will in January 1993 when she attempted 
to cancel visitation. Defendant testified that Will darted 
through the doorway as plaintiff was slamming it, leaving Will 
outside in the snow without a jacket. R. 3027-29. 
There is no evidence that defendant "attempted" to take 
the children in June 1993. This incident has been discussed at 
finding 16. Regarding the bicycle incident, defendant testified 
that he accidentally hit the car at "two or three miles an hour." 
Neither the bicycle nor the car was damaged. R. 3218. To make 
light of the incident, and not to scare his son, defendant yelled 
"crash" as he and Will had done many times before in the game 
they called "crash." R. 3219. Defendant testified that rather 
than being frightened or confused, Will was "laughing his head 
off." R. 3219. Defendant's "own witness," Dr. Mirow, did not 
testify that this behavior was inappropriate, only that it would 
be inappropriate to intentionally scare your own child in this 
manner, which defendant had not done. R. 2805. 
Finding 25. The Defendant refused to consider the 
problems that Will suffers which have been diagnosed by 
competent medical and psychological professionals to be 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. The Defen-
dant insists this does not exist, and went to great 
lengths to prove that this did not exist before the 
court. This has placed Will in the position of receiv-
ing input from one parent that there is a problem with 
which he must deal, while the other parent denies that 
it exists. The need of a child suffering from Atten-
tion Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder is for stability, 
42 
predictability, and consistency in their environment. 
The Plaintiff is capable of providing this environment. 
The Defendant is not. The Defendant has demonstrated 
an inability to accept this diagnosis. From the 
court's perception, this is not an issue the court is 
going to decide, nor need it decide it in terms of 
reaching a factual determination. It does not decide 
whether or not Will suffers from Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder. What the court does find, is 
that the Plaintiff after consulting with appropriate 
medical and psychological experts, determined that a 
problem existed and followed the professional advice 
she received in caring for Will. Instead of working 
with Plaintiff (the parent having temporary custody) 
the Defendant actively undermined and opposed the 
prescribed treatment thus demonstrating a desire to 
place his own wishes ahead of the best interest of his 
children even after consulting Dr. Frances Berger who 
tentatively confirmed the diagnosis and tried to coun-
sel the Defendant about his reaction to this informa-
tion. 
This finding is supported by the testimony of Elizabeth 
Stewart, R. 2321-23 and 3107-08, Dr. Goldsmith, R. 2438, 2442-45 
and 2462-63, plaintiff, R. 2559-60, 2581-83 and 2850-51, and Dr. 
Berger, R. 2900. It assumes, by ignoring plaintiff's express 
threat to make her own son "as sick as he needs to be,11 that Will 
has an emotional problem, and it concludes that plaintiff is 
better able to provide Will a structured, stable environment than 
defendant. The Court abused its discretion in making this 
finding. 
The Court's statement that "plaintiff after consulting 
with appropriate medical and psychological experts, determined 
that a problem existed and followed the professional advice she 
received" is perplexing. The undisputed testimony was that 
plaintiff did not consult with anyone until after she threatened 
to make her four-year-old son "as sick as he needs to be," 
R. 2841-43, strongly suggesting that Will's emotional problem was 
wholly contrived by plaintiff. 
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The only competent medical testimony came from 
defendant, a board certified physician who has prescribed Ritalin 
many times, and Dr. Delbert Goates, a psychiatrist specializing 
in ADHD. Defendant testified that Ritalin is a powerful drug 
that is very similar to methamphetamine. R. 3207. He testified 
that it should not be given to children below the age of six, and 
that it should only be given as a last resort, after attempts at 
nonmedical intervention have been exhausted. R. 3204-07. 
Defendant testified that the decision of Dr. Goldsmith 
to recommend that Will be put on Ritalin was reached too quickly 
because, of three environments in which Will was observed (with 
plaintiff, with defendant and at school), problems were reported 
in only one (with plaintiff), strongly suggesting that Will's 
problem, to the extent it existed at all, was environmental 
rather than emotional. R. 3205-06. Defendant was particularly 
concerned that Dr. Goldsmith had "diagnosed" Will entirely on 
plaintiff's complaints, without first consulting with defendant, 
Will's day care providers or a physician.28 R. 3205-06. 
Dr. Goates agreed with defendant. He testified that he 
rarely places a child on Ritalin before the third grade, R. 3276, 
and that he had not seen or heard sufficient information to place 
Will on medication. R. 3276. Dr. Goates also noted that if a 
child is misbehaving in specific circumstances rather than 
28
 Dr. Goldsmith admitted that he usually requires an 
observation period of two to three months before resorting to 
Ritalin, but that he recommended the immediate use of Ritalin to 
"calm down the stress at home between Will and his mother." R. 
2467. 
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general circumstances, it would be appropriate to treat the 
circumstances rather than medicating the child. R. 3201-09. 
Defendant testified that structure and attention is 
often all that is required to remedy behavioral problems in 
children,29 R. 3207, and that, after considering the potential 
side effects of the drug, which include stunted growth and 
elevated blood pressure, there were deeper reasons to avoid it: 
At a crucial point in the young man's life or 
young woman's life as the case may be, when 
the child is forming their self-image, when 
the child is learning to be part of society, 
when the child is learning that, you know, 
they are an okay person ... by giving them 
this pill you create a situation where they 
are special, they're different. 
And my view would be that if you're going to 
put a four-year-old or five-year-old in a 
situation where all the other kids are just 
kids, and he has to take his pill, then you 
have to have exhausted all the non-medical 
interventions first. 
R. 3208. Dr. Goates had similar concerns: "[Medication is] for 
the benefit of the child, not for the teacher or the parents. 
It's to protect the child's self-esteem and his growth." R. 
3276. 
Defendant then testified that it is inappropriate to 
give a child Ritalin unless the child has problem behavior. R. 
2307-08. Dr. Goates agreed, stating that "I frequently give 
parents considerable latitude in skipping or not using any dose 
whenever they can." R. 3296. Defendant testified that, because 
Dr. Goldsmith agreed that poor parenting skills can 
aggravate the behavior of a child with ADHD tendencies, R. 2234-
35, and he stated that he was uncertain whether the problems 
described by plaintiff were caused by plaintiff or by Will. R. 
2450. 
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Will was well-behaved when in his care, Will did not need to be 
medicated.30 To support his testimony, defendant offered many 
hours of videotape of the supposedly hyperactive Will playing 
quietly, unmedicated, during visitation with defendant. Ex. 65. 
Plaintiff's counsel objected on the ground of relevance. The 
Court, completely missing the point, ruled as follows: 
I am willing to listen to this testimony be-
cause I think, whether or not a parent gives 
medications that have been prescribed and 
follows the medical advice of treating physi-
cians is highly relevant. I am considering 
it in that regard. 
R. 3210. In finding that defendant "place[d] his own wishes 
ahead of the best interest of his children," the Court ignored 
competent medical testimony that it is inappropriate to 
administer Ritalin to a child that does not need it. This was 
clear error. 
II. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IGNORING 
CRITICAL FACTORS THAT WEIGHED HEAVILY IN FAVOR OF 
DEFENDANT AS THE CUSTODIAL PARENT 
The Court failed to consider which parent was more 
likely to provide the children with "frequent and continuing" 
contact with the noncustodial parent, and it failed to consider 
the parties' past conduct, as it is statutorily required to do. 
Section 30-3-10(2), Utah Code Ann., Sukin v. Sukin. 842 P.2d 922 
(Utah App. 1992). Plaintiff's conduct has been discussed 
throughout this brief, and it should have disqualified plaintiff 
30
 Dr. Stewart's lack of understanding of this drug was 
illustrated when she stated that defendant's failure to adminis-
ter Ritalin to Will evidenced his "insensitivity to the needs of 
others." R. 2274. 
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from consideration for being awarded the custody of the parties' 
children. Her approach to visitation was equally troublesome: 
1. On September 10, 1992, the day she was 
awarded temporary custody of the children, when she 
cancelled visitation, vaguely claiming that all three 
children were "sick." R. 3026. 
2. Later that month, she prevented defendant 
from moving his possessions from their home until after 
the lease had expired, knowing that defendant therefore 
would be forced to remove "rooms full" of possessions 
the following day, which was a visitation weekend. R. 
2881, 3023-24. 
3. On January 5, 1993, plaintiff cancelled 
visitation with Will when defendant arrived late after 
a major snowstorm. Hearing that he would not get to 
see his father, Will ran to the door. As Will darted 
through the doorway, plaintiff slammed it behind him 
and refused to give Will a jacket.31 R. 3025-28. 
4. After agreeing with defendant to January and 
February 1993 visitation, plaintiff "rescheduled" 
defendant's visitation to coincide exactly with his 
work schedule, denying him visitation until defendant 
obtained relief from the Court. R. 3192. 
5. On April 14, 1993, defendant's car would not 
start. He took a cab to defendant's residence, found 
no one home, and returned in the cab to his own 
residence. He then reached plaintiff by telephone and 
offered to take another cab to pick up the children. 
Plaintiff told him that visitation was cancelled 
because he was more than thirty minutes late. R. 3193. 
6. On June 4, 1993, plaintiff denied defendant's 
visitation by calling "911," feigning to the police 
that an unknown intruder was "breaking into" her house. 
R. 2833-34. 
7. On October 13, 1993, plaintiff cancelled 
visitation with no notice. When defendant arrived to 
pick up the children, they were simply gone. R. 3193. 
This pattern of conduct, so clear, with so many 
incidents, interfered with defendant's relationship with his 
31
 Dr. Stewart concluded that defendant, by taking Will 
only, was treating him as a favored child. R. 2268. She failed 
to realize that at that time the visitation order allowed defen-
dant to take only Will on Friday nights. R. 2717. 
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children. The Court abused its discretion in failing to consider 
this critical factor. 
III. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IMPROPERLY 
EXCLUDING IMPORTANT EVIDENCE THAT WENT TO THE 
HEART OF THIS DISPUTE 
Like factual findings, evidentiary rulings are reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Iorg. 801 P.2d 938, 939 
(Utah 1990). Here the Court improperly excluded important 
evidence that went to the heart of this matter32: 
1. Dr. Strassberg was not allowed to testify that Dr. 
Stewart's rejection of the parties' MMPI profiles was not 
consistent with the psychological profession. R. 3158-59. This 
was critical rebuttal testimony. 
2. Defendant's testimony regarding the structure and 
limits he provided the children was improperly cut short: 
Question: [T]he only thing we really talked about, as far as 
structure, is the red tape, or safety rules you've 
imposed. Do you feel that you create and foster a 
structured, disciplined environment for your chil-
dren when that's called for? 
Mr. Dolowitz: Objection, conclusion. 
The Court: The question's been answered. Let's move along, 
Mr. Woodall. 
The absence of this testimony was then used as the basis of 
Finding 18, that defendant does not provide structure or limits 
for his children. 
3. The Court accepted as conclusive evidence a 
hearsay statement that it admitted for the limited purpose of 
32
 The Court also allowed Dr. Stewart to testify, over 
defendant's objections, as to matters of which she had no 
knowledge, such as which parent imposed structure and limits on 
the children (R. 3105), and on the level of parent-child bonding 
at the time of trial (R. 3122). 
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showing the child's "state of mind," which formed the basis for 
finding 20. R. 2561. 
4. The most serious evidentiary error was the Court's 
refusal to consider testimony regarding witness tampering against 
defendant during the trial, which acts pointed to plaintiff: 
a. In the evening following the first day of 
trial, defendant's house was broken into and his car was shot. 
R. 2921. The police recovered a 9mm bullet from the door of his 
automobile. R. 2922. A diagram had been drawn on the car of a 
cupid's heart with "H.S. + A.A." written in the heart. Defendant 
had once given plaintiff a wooden plaque of a cupid's heart with 
"H.S. + H.S." written in it. "H.S." stood for "Honey Smacks," a 
term of endearment used in the Baldwin household. R. 2943. 
During the marriage, plaintiff accused defendant of being 
unfaithful, and she coined the term "Adolescent Angel," for the 
girlfriend she imagined defendant to have. R. 2943. The Court 
apparently concluding that defendant shot his own car: "To 
determine who, if anyone other than Dr. Baldwin, shot the gun 
into that car, would require a lengthy trial." R. 3189. 
b. On the morning of his scheduled testimony, 
defendant received a threat from an anonymous telephone caller 
who told him "You have said too much already. Next time it will 
be you, Honey Smacks." R. 3188 (counsel's proffer). The Court 
also ruled this irrelevant (R. 3189): 
The Court: What proof do you have as to who made the phone 
call, if it, in fact did occur? 
Mr. Woodall: Well, your honor, the proof is only in what was 
said, that Dr. Baldwin would swear to under oath. 
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The Court: All right, so Dr. Baldwin would say that occurred. 
Do you have anything else? 
Mr. Woodall: I have a nine millimeter slug that was retrieved 
from his car. 
The Court: Is that it? 
These incorrect evidentiary rulings affected at least 
three of the Court's findings (findings 18, 19 and 20), requiring 
a reversal of the Court's decision. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 120 (Utah 1989). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court deferred to Elizabeth Stewart's sixteen-
month- old report on virtually every issue it was presented, 
excluding crucial rebuttal evidence and ignoring the overwhelming 
body of evidence favoring defendant as the custodial parent. 
Plaintiff is a troubled person who threatened to make 
her own child "sick," and she carried out this threat. Will is 
happy and normal with his father. With his mother, who accuses 
him of "victimizing" her, he has a psychiatric diagnosis and is 
drugged. He is at risk for hypertension, stunted growth and 
unnecessary lifelong anxieties of being "not normal." Barbara 
and Andy are in the same environment, and subject to the same 
influences. Defendant requests an order reversing the decision 
of the court below, awarding him custody of all three children, 
subject to plaintiff's right of liberal visitation. 
DATED this tt> day of March 1995. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
BARBARA K. POLICH 
JftMHS H. WOODALL 
Attorneys for appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that I caused two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be delivered to the following 
on March 3 . 1995: 
David S. Dolowitz 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
SUSAN NEWELL BALDWIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM ANDREW BALDWIN, 
Defendant. 
COURT'S RULING 
CASE NO. 924902893 
This matter came before the Court for trial on October 18 
through the 21st, on October 25, 1993, and, finally, on January 10, 
1994• The issues presented were, a custody determination, the 
entitlement to and amount of alimony, the income of the parties, 
the amount of child support, property distribution, and attorneys 
fees. Testimony was adduced, videotapes reviewed, and written 
closing arguments and requests for relief of the parties were 
considered. The Court has now considered the testimony, 
videotapes, stipulations, exhibits received, arguments of counsel 
and the relevant law, and the Court rules as stated herein. 
Custody 
The Court awards legal and physical custody of the parties' 
three minor children to the plaintiff, subject to the defendant's 
liberal and reasonable rights of visitation. 
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The Court in reaching this decision has considered Pusey v. 
Pusev, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), and Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52, 
and other relevant law. 
In arriving at a decision on custody this Court first 
considered the possibility of a joint custody order. This 
approach, which offers the children a full relationship with each 
parent, is generally preferred if it is practically viable and in 
the best interests of the children. However, it appears clear that 
this is not an appropriate case for joint custody because of the 
parties' inability to meaningfully communicate and cooperate to 
meet the children's needs. The Court notes that the parents seem 
to have very disparate parenting styles and a very different 
assessment of the needs of the children. They have not even been 
able to agree on a diagnosis and a course of treatment for their 
son, Will. 
Next, the Court has considered whether there is value in 
keeping the children together. This Court generally sees keeping 
siblings together as an important and necessary objective. This 
case is not exceptional in that regard. The Court finds that these 
three siblings will benefit from being kept together in the same 
home. Therefore, a custody determination requires that the 
custodial parent be able to effectively parent all three children. 
BALDWIN V. BALDWIN PAGE THREE COURT'S RULING 
The Court finds that the plaintiff is the most clearly capable 
of providing stability, comfort, nurturance and a sense of 
belonging to all three children. The plaintiff has been 
consistently with and available to, the children from the birth of 
each child. She has been the primary caregiver of the children, 
although the Court notes the defendant has been very involved in 
the care of Will. This consistent steady availability of the 
plaintiff to all three children seems to this Court to be a factor 
in creating and maintaining stability in the home environment. The 
Court finds that, while both parents are bonded equally with Will, 
a greater bond exists between the plaintiff and the two youngest 
children, uhan between defendant and these children. The Court 
bases this finding upon the totality of testimony, particularly 
upon Dr. Stewart's testimony. Further, the Court has taken into 
account its own observation of the parties' appearance, demeanor 
and attitude as they spoke of the children and as they testified, 
in general. The Court also considered the fact that the defendant 
initially sought only custody of Will. Dr. Stewart's report 
stated, "Dr. Baldwin does not feel strongly about having custody of 
Barbara nor of two month old Andrew and he would be agreeable to 
splitting up the children with Barbara and Andrew remaining in Mrs. 
Baldwin's custody and Will being in his custody". (Ex. 1, p. 27.) 
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The Court finds that Dr. Stewart is an expert in issues concerning 
custody and had an opportunity to observe all three children 
interact with their parents. Dr. Stewart's report, received as Ex. 
1, states that: "Mrs. Baldwin has the ability to be fully involved 
with one child while at the same time monitoring the other two," 
and "Mrs. Baldwin is very sensitive to the children's individual 
differences and the importance of treating them equally. . . ." 
(Ex. 1, p. 19.) The Court finds this testimony credible and 
compelling. While defendant clearly loves all the children, and 
has a great deal to offer these children, the Court finds that he 
is not equally bonded to the three children. Dr. Stewart clearly 
opined that plaintiff would make the better custodial parent for 
the three children and is strongly and equally bonded to all three. 
The Court finds this testimony to be credible. 
The Court carefully considered the content of the parties' 
testimony and their appearance and demeanor in court, while they 
were on the stand and off. The Court observed plaintiff to be 
calm, and emotionally stable throughout the trial. Further, no 
animosity was seen in the plaintiff's interaction with defendant. 
The Court observed defendant to be openly antagonistic toward 
plaintiff, to be frequently agitated, emotional, and less calm than 
plaintiff, on each occasion that he was in court. 
BALDWIN V. BALDWIN PAGE FIVE COURT'S RULING 
The Court finds that both parents can provide the children 
with an appropriate environment in which to live. After viewing 
the videotapes offered by defendant, the Court concludes that 
defendant's home environment is particularly "child friendly". The 
Court also notes that the defendant stimulates creative play with 
his children. The Court, however, must consider not just the 
parenting skills each parent evinces with the children at present, 
but also what each can offer the children as a custodial parent, in 
the children's adolescent and teen years. 
The plaintiff has a demonstrated ability to provide consistent 
care and love and supervision of all three children. Further, the 
plaintiff can provide personal care for the children during the 
day, while the defendant would have to provide surrogate care. 
Again, this is consistent with Dr. Stewart's report, admitted as 
Exhibit 1, and her testimony. It should be noted that when a 
court makes a custody determination, great reliance is necessarily 
placed on an independent expert's custody evaluation. The 
evaluator in this case, Dr. Elizabeth Stewart, was agreed to by the 
parties, knew neither party prior to doing the evaluation, and she 
has worked in this community for many years, earning a reputation 
as a credible, objective evaluator. The Court's reliance on the 
expert is necessary since this Court did not directly observe the 
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parties interact with the children. Further, this Court lacks the 
expert's background in psychology and her extensive experience in 
making custody observations and assessments. 
However, the Court also notes that it has had an opportunity 
to carefully consider the appearance and demeanor of both plaintiff 
and defendant during the long hours of the trial. There are many 
inarticulable, and sometimes subtle aspects of appearance and 
demeanor that go into a finder of fact's assessments of things like 
emotional stability. The totality of the Court's observations has 
been taken into account, in arriving at this ruling. 
The custody evaluation reflects that each parent has a strong 
desire for custody and a commitment to parenting. This is 
consistent with the Court's observations of the parties and 
recollection of the parties' testimony. Since the Court has 
concluded, based upon a plethora of indicia that this is not a case 
for joint custody, this Court has also carefully considered which 
parent, if given custody, would be more likely to facilitate the 
visitation and interaction of the other with the children. 
The Court concludes, after having seen and heard from the 
parties in court on a number of occasions, that the plaintiff is 
far more likely, as custodial parent, to facilitate the childrens' 
interaction with the defendant, than vice-versa. The Court found 
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the defendant's testimony concerning the Park City outing to be 
particularly significant in this context. When defendant, enroute 
to Park City, experienced problems with his vehicle, he walked some 
distance in the sun/heat with the children, decided to keep the 
children with him overnight and chose not to call the plaintiff 
directly to seek assistance with the children, or to advise her of 
where he and the children were and what his plans were. 
Additionally, the 911 tape was considered compelling by the Court. 
The content and tone of the tape reflected an alarming degree of 
persistence, angry demands, intense pounding on doors and chaos, at 
the home, to which the children were insensitively subjected. 
While both parents might well have handled this situation 
differently, keeping the best interests of the children at the 
forefront of their minds, it is particularly clear that the 
defendant lost control and forgot what was best for the children. 
The Court has also noted that defendant acknowledged, while on 
the stand, that the plaintiff has been flexible regarding 
visitation in the past. 
The Court finds that plaintiff appears more likely to be able 
to consistently, over time, give the children comfort, structure, 
security and a sense of belonging and fitting in the world, and is 
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more likely to facilitate the children's bonding with one another, 
with friends and with the non-custodial parent. 
The custodial parent is to make the decisions pertaining to 
medical treatment of the minor children, and the non-custodial 
parent must abide by those decisions, although his input is to be 
considered, and the non-custodial parent must give any medications 
prescribed for the children, to them, when they are visiting with 
him. 
Information concerning work schedules is to be exchanged by 
the parties every two weeks. Visitation is to be arranged with 
work schedules in mind. 
Child Support 
Child support is to be set based upon the Child Support 
Guidelines, with the plaintiff's gross monthly income reflected at 
$1,665, and defendant's gross monthly income at $7,968 (i.e., 
annual gross income of $95,620, divided by 12) . Defendant's income 
is imputed, in part, based upon historical income and upon his own 
prognosis regarding an increase in his future earnings. 
This Court finds defendant has decreased his income, during 
the pendency of this action, by making certain choices, including 
rejecting certain employment opportunities, resulting in gross 
PI7RA 
BALDWIN V. BALDWIN PAGE NINE COURT'S RULING 
income for 1992 and 1993 that is dramatically reduced from previous 
years. 
In setting income and family support, this Court considers 
that defendant has a medical degree and is licensed and experienced 
as a physician with an internal medicine and a critical care 
medicine specialization, and that defendant also has a juris 
doctorate degree. Defendant is young (41) and enjoys good health. 
The Court finds that in 1990, defendant earned $103,717, and in 
1991 $98,145. While no tax return was filed for 1992, defendant 
estimated that he earned $80,000 to $90,000 in that year. 
Defendant was offered employment in 1992 at Wayne State University, 
at the rate of $105,000 a year. Additionally, the Court finds the 
defendant is extremely intelligent, licensed as both an attorney 
and physician, and able to practice medicine, do arbitration or 
even do forensic work. The Court also considers that defendants 
FHP salary when he quit was $96,000 a year, and defendant indicated 
his annual salary was $100,000 in June 1992 (See Ex. 57). The 
Court therefore takes the average of defendant's estimated income 
for 1992 ($85,000), and averages this with his income for 1991 and 
1990, and sets his income at $95,620 a year. Defendant is to pay 
child support, as set forth on the guidelines, using this figure 
for his income. 
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Defendant's historical income, his earning potential, and his 
own statement as to his probable increased future earnings, has 
been considered by the Court in arriving at defendant's income for 
purposes of setting support. Defendant is to pay one-half of the 
work-related child care costs plaintiff incurs. 
A child support worksheet is to be prepared by Mr. Dolowitz 
and integrated into and attached to his proposed Findings and 
Decree. 
Alimony 
The Court in fixing alimony has considered the standard set in 
Willev v. Willev, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App. 1993), and Jones 
v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), and analyzed the standard of 
living enjoyed by the parties, the financial condition and needs of 
plaintiff, the ability of plaintiff to produce income and the 
ability of defendant to provide support, including an assessment of 
his living expenses. 
The Court has also considered the amount of child support 
defendant will be paying and plaintiff receiving. 
The Court finds plaintiff's living expenses to be $4,624 (see 
Exhibit 11), and the defendant's living expenses to be $2,247 (see 
Ex. 51). The Court finds the parties enjoyed a very comfortable 
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standard of living during the marriage, which is consistent with 
the anticipated expenses. 
The plaintiff is therefore awarded $1,550 a month in alimony 
for a period of eight years, or until plaintiff remarries or 
cohabits. The Court anticipates that with payment of this amount, 
defendant can meet his expenses, and plaintiff can meet hers, with 
some downward adjustment of her expenses. Defendant's ability to 
pay support is clear, based upon his earning history, his work 
experience as a physician, and his education. Plaintiff will have 
to contribute to her own income, in order to meet her needs. 
Alimony is to be paid at this rate for a period of eight years. 
In determining the duration of alimony, the Court has 
considered the relatively short length of the marriage, the 
relatively young age of the parties, and the present need for the 
plaintiff to devote much of her time to the care of pre-school 
children. Once the youngest child is in school, the plaintiff will 
still have sufficient time to develop further job skills and 
experience and/or seek further education to improve her 
employability and earning capacity. It is anticipated that the 
duration of alimony will be sufficient to allow the plaintiff to 
become self-supporting by the time the alimony terminates. This 
alimony and child support award is effective December 1, 1993. 
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Division of Personal Property 
Each party is to keep what is in their possession with the 
exceptions noted herein. 
Defendant is awarded the chest of drawers in plaintiff's home, 
currently used by the parties' son, Will. Plaintiff is awarded the 
1980 Mercedes automobile and the other Mercedes is awarded to 
defendant. Additionally, if plaintiff elects to sell the 1980 
Mercedes, she is to offer defendant the right to purchase that 
vehicle from her at mid-blue book price. 
The Court finds that the existence and/or loss of 13 round cut 
diamonds and cash allegedly in the home has not been proven. The 
Court finds plaintiff's denial of knowledge of the existence of 
these diamonds is credible. Neither plaintiff, nor the marital 
estate is to be charged with these diamonds or the cash. 
Debts 
The defendant's student loans, all incurred prior to marriage, 
are to be paid by defendant. Any cash gifts from plaintiff's or 
defendant's family are excluded from the marital estate. 
Attorney's Fees 
Plaintiff has established a financial need for assistance in 
paying fees. The Court also finds that defendant is able to assist 
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plaintiff, even with his current obligations. Defendant is to pay 
his own fees and three-quarters of plaintiff's attorney's fees. 
The Court finds the fees of counsel for plaintiff were reasonable 
and necessary. The Court finds that plaintiff cannot pay her fees, 
without assistance, and there are no significant existing assets of 
the marriage that could be used to pay plaintiff's attorney's fees. 
Defendant's own circumstances and fees are such that the Court 
declines to order defendant to assume the full burden. 
In arriving at the finding that defendant is able to assist 
plaintiff, the Court has considered that defendant has already paid 
a significant amount to his attorneys for their representation, and 
may well have used some marital assets (including stock) to pay 
over $52,000 toward his attorney's fees. 
Mr. Dolowitz is to prepare detailed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and a Decree of Divorce consistent with, but 
not limited to, this Ruling and consistent with the totality of 
relevant testimony. These are to be submitted to opposing counsel, 
who will have fifteen (15) days to file written objections to the 
same. 
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This Court notes it has not considered anythincfgaid at the 
pretrial conference of this case. 
Dated this °^ -day of Ma 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT J 
£'. "intfWaz^ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
•7; 
S 
SUSAN NEWELL BALDWIN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 924902893DA 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis WILLIAM ANDREW BALDWIN, 
Defendant. 
—oooOooo— 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial, the Honorable 
Leslie A. Lewis presiding on October 1 8 - 2 1 , 1993, October 25, 1993, and January 10, 
1994. The Plaintiff was present in person represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz. 
The Defendant was present in person, represented by counsel Barbara K. Polich and 
James H. Woodall. The court heard and considered the testimony of the witnesses 
presented by each of the parties, the exhibits received into evidence, and the arguments 
of counsel, then took the matter under advisement. Thereafter, being advised in the 
premises, the court made and issued its ruling in written form on the 2nd day of March, 
1994 and to effect its ruling now makes and enters the following as its 
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1. The Plaintiff was a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah on 
the 8th day of July, 1992, when this action was filed and had been so for more than 
three months immediately prior thereto. 
2. The parties are husband and wife having been married on the 18th 
day of September, 1987 at Las Vegas, Nevada. 
3. Irreconcilable differences arose between the parties making 
continuation of their marriage relationship impossible. 
4. There were three children born as issue of this marriage, to-wit: 
William Baldwin, born May 23, 1988, age 5; Barbara Baldwin, born July 31, 1991, age 
2; and Andrew Baldwin, born June 29, 1992, age 1 year. 
5. Susan Baldwin has been the primary caretaker of the three minor 
children throughout the marriage of the parties. She was the exclusive caretaker of Will 
from his birth until Barbara's birth on July 31, 1991. Shortly after Barbara's birth when 
the Plaintiff discovered she was pregnant for a third time, Defendant, at Plaintiffs 
insistence began providing some care for Will. While the Defendant provided physical 
care for Will in terms of playing with him and taking him with him for various activities, 
he did not perform any other child care duties, such as cooking, cleaning, purchasing 
clothing or food, household chores, taking the children to medical appointments or other 
daily activities involved in child care. The Plaintiff provided all of these services for all 
three children. The Defendant at no time provided care for either Barbara or Andrew. 
6. The parents seem to have very disparate parenting styles and a very 
different assessment of the needs of the child. 
2 
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7. After each of the children was born, Will in 1988, Barbara in 1991, 
Andrew in June of 1992, the Defendant left town leaving the Plaintiff to cope by herself 
with the problems of a new child, and after Barbara's birth, with children who were 
already residing in the home. This occurred despite the fact that the date of each child's 
birth was known in advance. The Defendant put pursuit of his own interests ahead of 
those of providing care for the children (William, or William and Barbara) when Barbara 
and Andrew were born. 
8. Each of the parties can provide some personal care for the children, 
but it is the Plaintiff who has a history of using her time to provide personal care for the 
children while the Defendant has used this time for his own pursuits. 
9. The Plaintiff is a nurse. She worked after the birth of each of her 
children. She worked two shifts per week to keep certain benefits available for the family 
through the Veteran's Administration after Will was born. She resumed this employment 
after Barbara was born. After Andy's birth and instituting this action, she resumed work. 
10. Defendant has never provided personal care for Barbara and Andrew 
for longer than a weekend which occurred during the pendency of this matter. In 
addition, Defendant has, during the pendency of this matter, frequently charged his visits 
as he accepted work assignments around the country. He was unable to identify a 
future work schedule in court. He stated it would be unpredictable. Consequently, 
Defendant's theoretical ability to provide personal care is questionable. 
11. The Defendant has never provided personal care for Barbara or 
Andrew while the Plaintiff has regularly scheduled her shifts to provide custodial care for 
all three children. During the pendency of the matter the Defendant would not accept 
3 
regularly scheduled visitation because he declared his work prohibited him from doing 
so. His uncertain and irregular schedule with unpredictable times in which to provide 
personal care is a pattern that continued throughout the pendency of this action. In 
addition, the Plaintiff testified that when he had personal time free during the course of 
the marriage, while the parties resided together, Defendant frequently used this for 
research and writing rather than providing care for the children. The Defendant did not 
dispute this testimony regarding his use of his time. 
12. In determining the stability of the environment provided by each 
parent, the Plaintiff is clearly capable of supplying a much more stable environment than 
is the Defendant. Dr. Elizabeth Stewart, the only mental health professional who 
examined both the parties and their children on behalf of the court, was clear and 
unequivocal in testifying that it was the Plaintiff who could provide a stable, emotional 
environment for the children, not the Defendant. The behavior of the parties in the court 
during the trial confirmed the information provided by Dr. Stewart. The Plaintiff remained 
calm and provided information for the court. The Defendant became highly agitated and 
had difficulty keeping himself under control. On occasion the court had to admonish him 
or request the assistance of his counsel in keeping the Defendant under control so that 
the proceedings could continue. The Plaintiff presented non-accusatory information to 
the court about the experiences and parenting of the parties. The Defendant was 
accusatory and attacked the Defendant. In addition, the psychological testing of the 
parties, as described by the mental health professionals, as well as the clinical 
observations by Dr. Stewart indicated that while people and relationships are important 
to the Plaintiff, impersonal ideas are important to the Defendant. The children must be 
raised in an environment where they and their relationships to their parents, their peers, 
their families and each other are important. The Plaintiff is the parent who can create 
an environment in which these will be emphasized, maintained and taught. These are 
extremely important in the emotional stability of the environment maintained for the 
children. A custodial parent must provide comfort and security for a child and by 
personal care and using friends in a social environment, the Plaintiff has given the 
children an environment of adult caring. The Defendant did not provide such an 
environment and is unable to do so. 
13. While Defendant clearly loves all the children and has a great deal to 
offer these children, the court finds that he is not equally bonded to the three children. 
Dr. Stewart clearly opined the Plaintiff would make the better custodial parent for the 
three children and is strongly and equally bonded to all three. The Court finds this 
testimony to be credible. 
14. The court was advised by Dr. Stewart that she is very concerned 
when one parent alienates children from the other parent. She found, and the court has 
determined from the testimony of the parties and their conduct in court that Dr. Stewart 
correctly observed that the Defendant works to alienate the children from the Plaintiff by 
fault finding, criticism and derogatory comments. On the other hand, the Plaintiff does 
not engage in this behavior. 
15. The Court found the defendant's testimony concerning the Park City 
outing to be particularly significant in this context. When defendant, en route to Park 
City, experienced problems with his vehicle, he walks in distance in the sun/heat with the 
children, decided to keep the children with him overnight and chose not to call the 
plaintiff directly to seek assistance with the children, or to advise her of where he and 
the children were and what his plans were. 
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16. The 911 tape was considered compelling by the Court. The content 
and the tone of the tape reflected an alarming degree of persistence, angry demands, 
intense poundings on the doors, and chaos, at the home, to which the children were 
insensitively subjected. While both parents might well have handled this situation 
differently, keeping the best interest of the children at the forefront of their minds, it is 
particularly clear that the defendant lost control and forgot what was best for the children. 
17. Defendant acknowledged, while on the stand, that the plaintiff has 
been flexible regarding visitation in the past. 
18. Dr. Stewart described the difference between playing with and 
entertaining the children as opposed to providing every day structure and care. She 
testified that the structure a care giver would give would produce more resistance from 
a child than would simply playing with the child, yet this care giver providing structure 
would be providing more attention to the children than someone who simply played with 
the children. The Plaintiff is aware of the problems that arise from her providing 
structure for the children. The Defendant, not providing this type of structure, does not 
encounter this type of difficulty. The Plaintiff provides limits for the children and this 
produces conflicts. The Defendant does not. Instead of recognizing that this is a 
problem, the Defendant simply criticizes the Plaintiff to the children, which is a de-
stabilizing factor in their lives. The lack of this criticism in the home of Mrs. Baldwin is 
one of the stabilizing factors in the children's lives as it leaves them free to form an 
unfettered relationship with their father. Dr. Baldwin does not permit the children this 
freedom in their relationship with Mrs. Baldwin. This conduct by Dr. Baldwin is 
detrimental to the children. 
19. Will is strongly bonded with both parents. Andrew and Barbara have 
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strong bonding with the Plaintiff and weak bonding with the Defendant. The Defendant 
has not demonstrated an ability to provide care and supervision in a suitable 
environment for the children and meet their needs for a prolonged period of time. The 
Plaintiff has demonstrated an ability to provide care and supervision in a suitable 
environment for the children and meet their needs throughout their lives. 
20. The Defendant attempted to involve Will in the custodial dispute. He 
has advised Will that he (Will) will be placed in the Defendant's custody, thus trying to 
impact Will's preference for which parent he would reside. The Plaintiff has engaged in 
no such activity. This activity is considered to be seriously detrimental to Will. 
21. The law favors keeping siblings together. The Defendant initially 
wanted custody of Will but not Barbara or Andy. His position changed only as he went 
into trial, apparently after determining that he would not be able to successfully secure 
a separation of the children. These three children should be kept together in a family 
unit. The Plaintiff has sought custody of all three children throughout this action and has 
constantly maintained the position that the children should be kept together in a family 
unit. 
22. Dr. Stewart advised the court that she found the character and 
emotional stability of Susan Baldwin as a custodial parent, greatly exceeded that of 
Andrew Baldwin. No credible contrary evidence was presented to the court. The court 
finds that Susan Baldwin has, in terms of her character and her emotional stability for 
providing custodial care for the children, emotional stability and an ability to provide an 
emotionally stable environment which greatly exceeds that of the Defendant. 
23. The Plaintiff has demonstrated throughout the lives of the children 
a major commitment to custodial parenting. The Defendant has engaged in a playmate 
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role with his son Will but not even that with the other children. While the Plaintiff 
returned to work on a part time basis after the birth of the children, the Defendant 
worked full time and utilized his spare time to conduct research for the publication of 
articles rather than assisting with the children. In addition, the Defendant was, until trial, 
perfectly willing, and in fact, requested the court to separate the children. The desire 
and commitment for custody is clearly differentiated between the parties. The Plaintiff 
has sought custody of all the children throughout these pleadings, while the Defendant 
does not. In fact he advised the court in his January 10, 1994 testimony that he in 
reality wanted the Plaintiff to raise Barbara and Andy until they reached school age and 
then he would assume physical custody. 
24. The Defendant on several occasions created scenes that were 
emotionally disturbing to the children. He physically took the children from the Plaintiff 
in January of 1993 when Plaintiff did not agree to that visitation and attempted to take 
them again without her agreement in June, 1993. Prior to the filing of the divorce, he 
ran his bicycle into the family car, then told Will (untruthfully), who was in the car driven 
by the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff had hurt him and that he had to go to the hospital. Even 
the Defendant's own witnesses testified that this was totally inappropriate behavior. 
25. The Defendant refused to consider the problems that Will suffers 
which have been diagnosed by competent medical and psychological professionals to 
be Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. The Defendant insists this does not exist, 
and went to great lengths to prove that this did not exist before the court. This has 
placed Will in the position of receiving input from one parent that there is a problem with 
which he must deal, while the other parent denies that it exists. The need of a child 
suffering from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder is for stability, predictability, and 
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consistency in their environment. The Plaintiff is capable of providing this environment. 
The Defendant is not. The Defendant has demonstrated an inability to accept this 
diagnosis. From the court's perception, this is not an issue the court is going to decide, 
nor need it decide it in terms of reaching a factual determination. It does not decide 
whether or not Will suffers from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. What the court 
does find, is that the Plaintiff after consulting with appropriate medical and psychological 
experts, determined that a problem existed and followed the professional advice she 
received in caring for Will. Instead of working with Plaintiff (the parent having temporary 
custody) the Defendant actively undermined and opposed the prescribed treatment thus 
demonstrating a desire to place his own wishes ahead of the best interest of his children 
even after consulting Dr. Frances Berger who tentatively confirmed the diagnosis and 
tried to counsel the Defendant about his reaction to this information. 
26. Information concerning work schedules is to be exchanged by the 
parties every two weeks. 
27. Visitation is to be arranged with work schedules in mind. 
28. As of January 10,1994, the Plaintiff is earning $1,700.00 per month. 
She is doing this working 4 shifts per week. Dr. Stewart advised her to work no more 
than 2 shifts per week but because of the failure of the Defendant to provide regular, 
timely support, as ordered by the court (though he was current on support through the 
final day of trial in this matter of January 10, 1994), it appears she will have to work 4 
shifts and the court finds that her income should be based upon the 4 shifts per week. 
29. In October of 1993, the Defendant testified that he was earning 
$30.00 per hour and expected that he could earn in the neighborhood of $50,000.00 per 
year working in Tooele, Utah. On January 10, 1994, Defendant testified he would be 
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earning $50,000.00 - $60,000.00 per year with full time employment at InstaCare. 
However, the Defendant earned $103,717.00 in 1990 and $98,145.00 in 1991. In 1992, 
Defendant worked for FHP until September and he had an agreement with Wayne State 
University Medical School to become a faculty member for which he would have been 
paid $105,000.00 per year, to-wit: $8,750.00 per month. After the Plaintiff filed this 
action, the Defendant declined to follow through with his commitment to Wayne State 
University and has not worked at employment that would pay him at the rate of pay he 
would have earned at Wayne State University since declining that employment. 
30. The Defendant is a medical specialist (critical care medicine, internal 
medicine, family medicine). He participates in a national employment market and is 
capable of employment at $105,000.00 per year in that market. He has deliberately 
chosen not to pursue that employment as a result of this divorce action. In addition to 
his medical specialties, he is a lawyer, licensed to practice law who has served as an 
arbitrator for the courts in California. The court finds that as the Defendant himself 
testified, the market in which the Defendant would be employed is a national market and 
in that national market he is capable of earning $105,000.00 per year. The court further 
finds that the Defendant has voluntarily chosen not to accept this employment and to 
remain employed in positions where he is paid at a rate below the income that he is 
capable of earning. The income that would have been paid to Defendant by Wayne 
State University is comparable to that which he would have earned had he continued to 
work with FHP, his employer at the time this action commenced. The Defendant 
voluntary terminated his contract with FHP and voluntarily chose not to accept the 
offered employment at Wayne State University. 
31. The court heard the Defendant testify that the prevailing earnings for 
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persons of his background in the national community is in the range the Defendant was 
being paid by FHP and Wayne State University. While employment in these specialties 
might not be immediately available to Defendant in the area of Salt Lake City, Utah, it 
is available to him in the national market in which he qualifies. The Defendant has 
voluntarily chosen not to participate in the market for which he is qualified and thus is 
voluntarily earning wages below those that he is capable of earning. 
32. The Plaintiff has a need for income based upon living expenses for 
herself and her children of $4,624.00 per month. (See Exhibit II) By application of the 
Uniform Child Support Guidelines of the State of Utah, finding the Plaintiff has a monthly 
income of $1,700.00 per month and the Defendant should have imputed income to him 
of $7,968.00 per month, the Defendant should pay child support to the Plaintiff in the 
sum of $1,467.00 per month, thus leaving Plaintiff an unmet need of $3,157.00 per 
month. (See attached worksheet.) 
33. The Defendant, counting his imputed income, has income of 
$7,968.00 per month, and has a need of $2,247.00 per month for his own living 
expenses. (See Exhibit 51) He is capable of paying alimony to meet the need of the 
Plaintiff of $1,550.00 per month as alimony. This is below the full need of the Plaintiff 
for alimony but is consistent with meeting her need after considering her earnings and 
Defendant's ability to pay support in light of the standard of living maintained by the 
parties during their marriage and the needs of each of the parties to support their own 
living expenses. 
34. The parties enjoyed a very comfortable standard of living during the 
marriage, which is consistent with the anticipated expenses. 
35. Defendant's ability to pay support is clear, based upon his earning 
1 1
 n t / o o 
history, his work experience as a physician and his education. 
36. Plaintiff will have to contribute to her own income in order to meet her 
needs. 
37. The Court has considered the relatively short length of the marriage, 
the relatively young age of the parties, and the present need for the plaintiff to devote 
much of her time to the care of preschool children. Once the youngest child is in school, 
plaintiff will still have sufficient time to develop further job skills and experience and/or 
seek further education to improve her employability and earning capacity. 
38. Each party has personal property in his or her possession. Plaintiff 
has in her possession certain personal property and has in her possession a chest of 
drawers. 
39. Defendant has in his possession certain personal property. 
40. The Plaintiff in her household is making use of a set of drawers, 
which the Defendant owned prior to marriage. They are being used by Will for his 
clothes. The Defendant has requested that this set of drawers be returned to him. 
41. The parties own two Mercedes automobiles. The Defendant has 
requested that both of them be awarded to him. 
42. The Defendant claims that there are 13 round cut diamonds which 
having a value of $40,000.00 and $8,020.00 in cash which he left in the house, which 
are missing. He claims that they were buried in the yards of homes in which the parties 
resided during their marriage, but that they were in his study when he left the marital 
home. The Plaintiff denies any knowledge of these items. 
43. The Defendant has liabilities of approximately $18,000.00 in student 
loans incurred prior to the marriage of the parties. 
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44. The Plaintiff received a cash gift of $20,000.00 from her parents. 
The Defendant claims this is a marital asset. The Defendant claims that as a gift from 
her parents, it is her separate property. 
45. The Defendant claims an inheritance of $58,000.00 from his mother. 
He asserts this is a non-marital asset. He also related that he received cash from his 
grandmother totaling $23,000.00 in gifts given in the fall of 1987, 1988, and 1989. It was 
the claim of the Defendant that this money was placed in various securities and trust 
accounts for the children. At the time of trial, all of these monies had been expended. 
46. Defendant has advised this court through his Financial Declaration 
dated January 4, 1993 that he has in force and effect a life insurance policy with First 
International Life Insurance in the face amount of $750,000.00. 
47. The Plaintiff has requested that the Defendant pay the costs and 
attorney's fees incurred by her. The Defendant had paid more than $52,000.00 for his 
own attorney's fees which he testified exceeded $100,000.00. The Plaintiff has paid 
approximately $8,000.00 on her attorney's fees, which at the time of trial were estimated 
to be $71,000.00 but were subject to additions as post-trial proceedings would be 
expected. 
48. The attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff are reasonable and 
necessary. They include charges for a legal assistant who worked with and under the 
supervision of counsel for the Plaintiff. The work done by the legal assistant would have 
to have been performed by an attorney had it not been done by her. Counsel for the 
Plaintiff limits his practice to family law and bills at a rate of $175.00 per hour. By using 
the assistance of Frances Terrill, the legal assistant, for whom counsel bills $55.00 per 
hour, counsel for Plaintiff provided representation for the Plaintiff at a cost of $113.26 per 
hour which is below the rate customarily charged for equivalent services in this area. 
In addition the court finds the Defendant has expended a higher sum for his legal 
representation than has the Plaintiff. Finally, the court finds the Plaintiff is in need of 
assistance in paying her attorney's fees as she does not have either the resources or 
earning capacity of Defendant to meet them and the high costs of this action. 
49. Defendant's own circumstances and fees are such that the Court 
declines to order defendant to assume the full burden. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters the 
following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court has jurisdiction over the parties, their children, William 
Baldwin, born May 23, 1988, age 5; Barbara Baldwin, born July 31, 1991, age 2; and 
Andrew Baldwin, born June 29, 1992, age 1 year, and the subject matter of this action. 
2. The Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce which should become 
final upon entry. 
3. Legal and physical custody of the parties' three minor children should 
be awarded to the Plaintiff, subject to the Defendant's liberal and reasonable rights of 
visitation. 
4. Legal and physical custody of the parties1 three minor children should 
be awarded to the Plaintiff and subject to the defendant's reasonable rights of visitation. 
Information containing work schedules is to be exchanged by the parties every two 
weeks. Visitation is to be arranged with work schedules in mind. 
5. As the Plaintiff has been awarded the care, custody and control of 
the minor children of the parties, the Defendant should be enjoined and prohibited from 
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interfering with, undermining, or changing the medical care arrangements she has made 
for the children except for medical emergencies occurring when the children are visiting 
the Defendant. 
6. The court determines that child support should be set based upon 
the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines, with the Plaintiffs gross monthly income
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reflected at $1,665.00 and Defendant's gross monthly income at $7,968.00, to-wit: $ 
$1,467.00 per month. JU O c ^ ~ ^ ^ A / ^ ^ ^ X 7 ~ 7 G U / 
C^sn^. ^ r r 7 he Plaintiff shoiffd be awarded alimony in the amount of $1,550.00 
per month for a period of eight years, or until Plaintiff remarries or cohabits. The 
alimony and child support award is effective December 1, 1993. 
8. Each party should be awarded the personal property presently in 
their possession with the exceptions of the chest of drawers in Plaintiffs home currently 
used by the parties' son, Will. 
9. Plaintiff should be awarded the 1980 Mercedes automobile and the 
other Mercedes is awarded to the Defendant. If, however, Plaintiff elects to sell the 1980 
Mercedes, she is to offer Defendant the right to purchase that vehicle from her at mid-
blue book price. If he declines to buy it, she may sell it and use the proceeds of sale. 
If title to the car is not in her name, Defendant should be ordered to transfer that to her 
and if he refuses to do so, the title should be transferred by the Decree of Divorce. 
10. Neither Plaintiff, nor the marital estate, is to be charged with the 
existence and/or loss of 13 round cut diamonds and cash allegedly in the home as the 
existence of these diamonds and cash have not been proven. 
11. Defendant should be ordered to pay his student loans, which were 
all incurred prior to the marriage. 
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12. Defendant should be ordered to maintain in full force and effect as long 
as child support and alimony is in effect the life insurance policy with First International 
Life Insurance with a face amount of $750,000 and to list the Plaintiff as the beneficiary 
thereon. 
13. Any cash gifts from Plaintiffs or Defendant's family are excluded 
from the marital estate. 
14. Each party should be awarded the personal property presently in their 
possession with the exception of the chest of drawers which was in plaintiffs home 
which shall be awarded to defendant. 
15. Defendant should be ordered to assist Plaintiff with payment of her 
attorney's fees, as well as paying his own. This court finds that fees of counsel for 
Plaintiff are reasonable and necessary. Consequently, Defendant should be ordered to 
pay three-quarters of Plaintiffs attorney's fees. These shall be set by subsequent order 
after the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree are finalized by the court, 
counsel for Plaintiff shall file a cost bill and from that the court will set the attorney's fees 
and costs, including expert witness costs, to be ordered paid by Defendant. 
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DATED this lb' day of 
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BY THE COURT: 
•X/)> 
LESLIE A. LEWIS, DISTRfcTXJOURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND 
CONTENT: 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, Counj 
for Plaintiff 
BARBARA K. POLICH, Counsel 
for Defendant. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered this ^ 7 day of July, 
1994, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
to the following individual: 
Barbara K. Polich 
James H. Woodall 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Ste. 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for Defendant 
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